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LOBBYING, RENT-SEEKING, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
Richard L. Hasen*
Politicians across the political spectrum, from Barack Obama to Sarah Palin and Rand Paul, routinely castigate lobbyists for engaging in supposedly corrupt activities or having unequal access to elected officials. Since attaining office
President Obama has imposed unprecedented new lobbying regulations, and he
is not alone: both Congress and state and local legislative bodies have done so in
recent years. At the same time, federal courts, relying upon the Supreme Court’s
new campaign finance decision in Citizens United v. FEC, have begun striking
down lobbying regulations, including important regulations that limit campaign
finance activities of lobbyists and impose a waiting period before legislators or
legislative staffers may work as lobbyists. Two courts have held such laws could
not be sustained on anticorruption grounds, and they are unlikely to be sustained
on political equality grounds either.
This Article advances an alternative rationale which could support some,
though not all, of the recent wave of new lobbying regulations: the state’s interest
in promoting national economic welfare. Lobbyists threaten national economic
welfare in two ways. First, lobbyists facilitate rent-seeking activities. Rentseeking occurs when individuals or groups devote resources to capturing government transfers, rather than putting them to a productive use, and lobbyists are
often the key actors securing such benefits. Second, lobbyists tend to lobby for
legislation that is itself an inefficient use of government resources.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the current state of lobbying
regulation and lobbying jurisprudence. Part II proposes a new national economic
welfare rationale for lobbying regulation. It begins by describing the political
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science literature on how lobbying works, as well as current statistics on the extent of lobbying on the federal level and the costs of lobbyist-driven rent-seeking
on the national economy. Some of the new and proposed lobbying regulations,
such as antibundling provisions and anti-revolving-door provisions, could decrease the total amount of interest group rent-seeking. The state’s national economic welfare interest must be balanced against the First Amendment costs of
lobbying regulation in infringing on the right to speak and petition the government. I defend this interest as an important (even potentially compelling) state interest that justifies at least some new lobbying regulations against constitutional
challenge.
Part III turns to objections and extensions of the argument. I respond to objections on both ends and means. On ends, I consider the circumstances in which
the promotion of national economic welfare can trump First Amendment rights.
On means, I consider whether there is sufficient proof that lobbying regulations
are sufficiently tailored to a reduction in rent-seeking and whether, because of
the “hydraulic” nature of money in politics, attempts to regulate lobbying so as
to decrease rent-seeking will be easy to evade. Under extensions, I consider
whether the national economic welfare rationale could be used to justify the reenactment, as suggested by Justice Stevens, of the ban on spending corporate treasury funds in candidate elections, as well as the recent SEC “pay-to-play” rule
for investment advisers.
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INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama and former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin may not
have a lot in common, but they share a common enemy: “Washington lobbyists.” As a presidential candidate, Obama declared that “[i]f you don’t think
lobbyists have too much influence in Washington, then I believe you’ve probably been in Washington too long.”1 He explained his refusal to take campaign
contributions from federally registered lobbyists on the grounds that lobbyists
can “drown out the views of the American people.”2 As President, he criticized
an “army of lobbyists” spending millions of dollars in an unsuccessful attempt
to block passage of a bill reforming practices in the student loan industry.3
Sarah Palin has expressed similar views. When Fox News host Sean Hannity asked Palin if campaign contributions to then-Senator Obama and other
members of Congress caused lax congressional oversight over mortgage giants
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Palin replied that “even more significant [than
contributions] is the role that the lobbyists play in an issue like this.”4 She ex-

1. Perry Bacon Jr., Edwards, Obama Press Lobby Issue, WASH. POST 44 (Aug. 6,
2007, 6:01 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2007/08/edwards-obama-keep
-pressing -lo.html.
2. DNC Bans Lobbyist Money, MSNBC (June 5, 2008, 2:03 PM), http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/24989468/from/toolbar. Obama did accept contributions from state lobbyists and from law firm members whose partners were lobbyists. See Dan Morain, An Asterisk to Obama’s Policy on Donations, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, at A1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/22/nation/na-obama22.
3. Damian Paletta, Obama Takes Another Swipe at Banks, WALL ST. J. WASH. WIRE
(Mar. 30, 2010, 1:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/03/30/obama-takes-another
-swipe-at-banks.
4. Ryan Powers, Palin Blames Lobbyists Like Her Campaign Manager for the Failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 17, 2008, 10:10 PM),
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plained her views further in a Facebook post, in which she decried “crony capitalism” in negotiations over the financial reform bill: “Does anyone doubt that
firms with the most lobbyists and the biggest campaign donations will be the
ones who get seats in the lifeboat?”5 She explained that “the big players who
can afford lobbyists work the regulations in their favor, while their smaller
competitors are left out in the cold.”6
Newly elected U.S. Senator (and Tea Partier) from Kentucky, Rand Paul,
went even further in his criticism of lobbyists. He declared that “[l]ast year,
over 15,000 individuals worked for organizations whose sole goal was to rip
you off. No, not the mafia or Goldman Sachs, but another distinctly criminal
class—Washington lobbyists.”7 He called upon Congress to include in all government contracts worth at least $1 million a clause barring the contractor from
engaging in any lobbying activities or making campaign contributions.8
The focus by both the left and right on lobbyists and the supposed evils of
lobbying is understandable. Every piece of major federal legislation has been
influenced by (and sometimes portions even written by) lobbyists. Lobbyists
are a key means by which interest groups pursue their goals in the political arena. In difficult times like these, when people are looking for someone to blame
for a financial meltdown,9 a failing health care system,10 or a broken blowout
preventer leading to a catastrophic oil spill,11 lobbyists are a convenient target.

http://thinkprogress.org/2008/09/17/palin-blames-davis (providing embedded video and
analysis of Palin’s interview with Hannity).
5. Sarah Palin, Institutionalizing Crony Capitalism, FACEBOOK (Apr. 22, 2010, 7:28
PM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=382303098434.
6. Id.
7. Rand Paul, The Public Trough, AM. CONSERVATIVE, Aug. 2009, at 35, 35, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20100326125712/http://www.randpaul2010.com/issues/a
-g/campaign-finance-reform.
8. Id.; see also Sam Stein, Rand Paul: Ban Federal Contractors from Lobbying,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2010, 2:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/07/
rand-paul-ban-federal-con_n_603178.html.
9. For example, in February 2010, Elizabeth Warren stated her belief that lobbyists
were responsible for the failure to pass a financial reform bill. Real Time with Bill Maher
(HBO television broadcast Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.movieweb.com/tv/
TEjWgpoqWFxjnk/elizabeth-warren-chair-congressional-oversight-panel-on-tarp.
10. For example, Robert Reich said that the Obama Administration gave up on additional regulation in its health care bill in return for “big pharma and big insurance” agreeing
“not to oppose healthcare legislation with platoons of lobbyists and millions of dollars of TV
ads.” Chris McGreal, Revealed: Millions Spent by Lobby Firms Fighting Obama Health Reforms, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2009, 11:55 AM EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/
oct/01/lobbyists-millions-obama-healthcare-reform.
11. Member of Congress Dave Loebsack (D-Iowa) explained the cause of the Gulf oil
spill as “nearly a decade [of] Big Oil lobbyists [being] in charge of our energy policy.” Alex
Kline, Grassley, Harkin, and Loebsack Weigh In on the Gulf Spill, DAILY IOWAN (June 16,
2010, 7:30 AM), http://dailyiowan.com/2010/06/16/Metro/17536.html.
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Despite the recent popular attacks on lobbying and lobbyists, lobbying regulation traditionally has been lax, and therefore lobbying law justifiably has received scant attention from legal scholars. Before the 1990s, lobbying disclosure laws were ineffective, thanks to the Supreme Court’s chary interpretation
of the scope of the 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act in United States
v. Harriss.12 The main interesting legal issues arose over the meaning of the
term “lobbying” at the intersection of lobbying law and tax law, because certain
tax-exempt organizations face limitations on their ability to “lobby”13 and because of shifting treatment of the tax deductibility of lobbying expenses by
businesses. In 1995 Congress passed a somewhat more effective lobbying disclosure law, the Lobbying Disclosure Act,14 and that new law prompted a small
amount of academic writing about whether the revised disclosure rules were
constitutional and whether they could be made more effective.15 Still, the concept of lobbying and the rationales for lobbying regulation remain undertheorized.
Two emerging conflicting forces are likely to move the question of lobbying regulation to the front burner, both for scholars and the courts. On the one
hand, in the past few years, government actors have enacted unprecedented
new lobbying regulations.16 For example, the Obama Administration banned
lobbyists from orally communicating with the administration about certain economic legislation during the recent financial crisis and required any written
lobbyist comments to be posted on government websites.17 States have imposed their own limits, such as laws barring lobbyists from contributing to candidates or soliciting campaign contributions for the elected officials they lobby.
On the other hand, courts, relying in part upon the Supreme Court’s new deregulatory campaign finance jurisprudence culminating in Citizens United v.

12. 347 U.S. 612 (1954). For a history of federal lobbying regulation, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in THE LOBBYING
MANUAL 5 (William V. Luneburg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009); and Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals Since 1955, in THE
LOBBYING MANUAL, supra, at 23.
13. For an excellent and accessible treatment of lobbying, see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer,
What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485
(2008).
14. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (2006 & Supp. I 2007)).
15. See, e.g., William V. Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying Disclosure: A
Recipe for Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 32 (2006).
16. For thoughtful reflections on the rise in demand for lobbying regulation, written
before he was chosen as President Obama’s White House Counsel, see Robert F. Bauer,
Keynote Address to Inside Counsel’s Ninth Annual Conference (May 5, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/news.html?AID=1451).
17. Kenneth P. Vogel, Obama Order Worries Speech Groups, POLITICO (Mar. 28,
2009, 7:26 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20580.html.
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FEC,18 have begun striking down new lobbying regulations as violating the
First Amendment. In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,19 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down a Connecticut law
that barred campaign contributions to state candidates by lobbyists. It also
struck down a law barring lobbyists from engaging in fundraising. In Brinkman
v. Budish,20 a federal district court in Ohio struck down a “revolving-door” statute that barred former state legislators and staffers from lobbying the legislature for twelve months after leaving service.
The conflict between these forces will require us to grapple more deeply
with both the concept of lobbying and the rationales for lobbying regulation.
The activity of lobbying—trying to influence the legislative and executive
branches in a particular area21—squarely implicates both the Free Speech and
Petition Clauses of the First Amendment. Speech aimed at influencing government action is core political speech, and it would certainly be both unconstitutional and poor public policy to bar individuals from lobbying to change government action.22 The right to petition promotes accountability of elected
officials by ensuring that they are informed about constituents’ preferences and
the likely effects of public policy choices.
But lobbying has been associated with a variety of social ills as well. One
well-known problem is that of quid pro quo corruption. In the past few years,
most notably in the Jack Abramoff scandal, lobbyists, elected officials, and
staffers have been arrested and convicted for violating various lobbying, reporting, and ethics laws.23 Most commonly, lobbyists gave misreported or unreported gifts to elected officials or staffers. Relatively few lobbyists have been
involved in corrupt activities, but these highly salient events can color the public’s perception of the entire profession.
Lobbying is problematic even if we put aside corruption concerns and the
overheated (and usually unwarranted) criticism of lobbyists. For example, lob-

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010).
692 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
I will use this as a rough, working definition of lobbying, even though legal regulation of lobbying tends to be much narrower. One important narrowing is the extent to which
“grassroots lobbying,” by which organizations seek to mobilize public support for or against
legislation, is exempt from regulation.
22. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915 (“[T]he Court has upheld registration and
disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying
itself.”).
23. For a vivid account of Abramoff’s activities, placed in the context of Washington
lobbying more broadly, see ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF
LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2009). Work from the Washington Post’s Pulitzer Prize-winning coverage of the Abramoff scandal appears at Investigating Abramoff—Special Report, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/linkset/2005/06/22/LI2005062200936.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
18.
19.
20.
21.
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bying appears to skew public policy in particular directions. The reason for the
skewing is that those with resources and with narrow (as opposed to diffuse)
interests in particular legislation can more easily overcome collective action
problems and engage in political activity such as hiring lobbyists who—usually
because of their past careers as elected officials or staffers or because of their
extensive fundraising activities on behalf of elected officials—have easy access
to elected officials and their staff.
When lobbying laws were confined simply to disclosure rules, courts had
an easy time engaging in the balancing of individual rights of free speech and
petition against state interests. The Supreme Court and lower courts have ruled
clearly and repeatedly that the state has sufficiently important anticorruption
and information-based reasons to compel the disclosure of lobbying-related information. But the calculus has become more difficult as legislative and executive branch actors have enacted stricter lobbying laws, and as the courts, following the Supreme Court’s lead, have become more skeptical of limits on the
use of money to influence political outcomes. Green Party and Brinkman both
relied upon Citizens United in concluding that parts of state laws regulating
lobbyists interfered too much with political rights and could not be justified on
anticorruption grounds. The conclusion is unsurprising (though not inevitable)
given Citizens United’s dictum endorsing a very stingy definition of corruption.24
The purpose of this Article is to advance an alternative rationale which
could support some (though not all) of the recent wave of new and proposed
lobbying regulations: the state’s interest in promoting national economic welfare.
Lobbyists threaten national economic welfare in two ways. First, lobbyists
facilitate activity which economists term rent-seeking.25 One common form of
rent-seeking occurs when individuals or groups devote resources to capturing
government transfers, rather than putting them to a productive use, and lobbyists are often the key actors securing such benefits. Second, lobbyists tend to
lobby for legislation that is itself an inefficient use of government resources,
such as funding the building of a “bridge to nowhere.”
Whether it is a plea to keep an obsolete weapons program or to secure a
private tax benefit for a company (often in a provision buried deep in a thousand-page bill), lobbyists are masters at capturing economic benefits or “rents”
for their clients, particularly on low-salience issues about which elected officials have little personal preference. Though Justice Stevens and a few scholars

24. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10 (limiting the definition of “corruption” to
quid pro quo corruption and holding that influence over or access to elected officials cannot
be the basis for a corruption claim). Following Citizens United, any argument based on egalitarian concerns almost certainly would fail as well.
25. For a more precise definition of “rent-seeking,” see below Part II.B.1.a.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1734428

198

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:191

writing about the state’s anticorruption interest in campaign spending limits
have suggested taking rent-seeking into account in the constitutional analysis,26
these scholars have neither considered in depth the costs and benefits of accepting a national economic welfare rationale as a compelling interest to justify
government regulation nor considered the application of the rationale to lobbying regulation.
The national economic welfare rationale for lobbying regulation focuses on
the systemic negative economic costs of lobbying activity, a rationale for lobbying regulation apart from the argument that elected officials act corruptly in
doing favors for lobbyists. The latter approach not only unfairly impugns the
reputation of all lobbyists and elected officials in Washington; it is simply inaccurate. Indeed, the best political and legal strategy going forward for those supporting lobbying regulation is to shift talk from anticorruption or political
equality concerns to the social inefficiency of lobbying practices. The courts
and public are quite aware of the current precarious economic condition of the
United States, especially in relation to other countries, and if the $3.6 billion
per year lobbying industry is contributing to U.S. economic decline, reasonable
regulation seems both necessary and important.
Courts which might reject anticorruption and equality rationales for some
lobbying regulations nonetheless ought to view the promotion of national economic welfare as a sufficiently important, even compelling, government interest so as to justify many of the new lobbying regulations. When a group pays a
lobbyist with easy access to elected officials to lobby on the group’s behalf, the
lobbyist may facilitate socially inefficient activity. Lobbying laws that make it
more difficult for interest groups to purchase access—such as anti-revolvingdoor laws and laws that make it harder for lobbyists to ingratiate themselves
with elected officials by engaging in fundraising activities on the officials’ behalf—should lead to a decrease in the total amount of inefficient legislation,
and for this reason such restrictions have a good chance of passing constitutional scrutiny under the national economic welfare rationale. In contrast,
courts should be more willing to strike down laws that seriously interfere with
free speech or petition rights but do little to promote efficiency. For example,
courts should be skeptical of laws that ban (as opposed to limit) lobbyist campaign contributions. The hardest cases under the national economic welfare rationale are laws that both have the strong potential to limit the amount of inefficient activity but also impose real First Amendment costs, such as those that
bar lobbyist fundraising for candidates; in such cases, courts need to engage in
careful balancing.
If courts accept the national economic welfare rationale as a sufficiently
important interest to justify some lobbying laws, the rationale could have much
broader implications. Most importantly, following the Citizens United case, the
26. See infra Part III.B.1.
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rationale could justify reestablishing limits on corporate spending in candidate
elections, or at least reestablishing such limits as to government contractors.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the current state of lobbying
regulation and lobbying jurisprudence. It begins by sketching current federal
lobbying disclosure and tax regulations. It then describes new and proposed
state and federal regulations, including the controversial Obama Administration
initiatives. Part I then turns to existing lobbying jurisprudence. It explains that
courts have upheld lobbying disclosure and tax regimes on anticorruption and
informational grounds. It then recounts the Supreme Court’s shift in the Citizens United case, and uses two lower court cases relying on Citizens United to
illustrate why certain lobbying regulations may not (or may no longer) pass
constitutional muster under the anticorruption rationale.
Part II proposes a new national economic welfare rationale for lobbying
regulation. It begins with a sketch of the political science literature on how lobbying works, as well as current statistics on the extent of lobbying on the federal level and the costs of lobbyist-driven rent-seeking on the national economy.
Given what we know about lobbying, I argue that some of the new and proposed lobbying regulations, such as antibundling provisions, could decrease the
inefficiency of lobbying activity. Anti-revolving-door provisions also solve related agency problems attendant when elected officials or staffers must make
official decisions while still on the government payroll but with one eye on future lobbying-related employment.
I defend the promotion of national economic welfare as an important, even
compelling, state interest. Though other scholars have proposed taking rentseeking into account indirectly as a procedural rule applied when reviewing and
interpreting statutes, I argue for a more direct use of an efficiency rationale to
justify lobbying regulation. The state’s interest in promoting national economic
welfare must be balanced against the First Amendment costs of lobbying regulation. I conclude that courts ought to accept the rationale as justifying at least
some lobbying regulations against constitutional challenge.
Part III turns to objections and extensions of the argument. I respond to objections on both ends and means. On ends, I consider the circumstances in
which the promotion of national economic welfare can trump First Amendment
rights. On means, I consider whether there is adequate proof that lobbying
regulations are sufficiently tailored to the promotion of national economic welfare and whether, because of the “hydraulic” nature of money in politics, attempts to regulate lobbying so as to improve efficiency will be easy to evade. I
also reject an argument for shrinking the size of the state as a more narrowlytailored alternative than lobbying limits. Finally, under extensions, I consider
whether the national economic welfare rationale could be used to justify the
reenactment, as suggested by Justice Stevens, of the ban on spending corporate
treasury funds in candidate elections, as well as the recent SEC “pay-to-play”
rule for investment advisers. I conclude that the current Supreme Court is un-
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likely to accept the rationale to justify complete bans on spending money to affect political outcomes; but the rationale could well be found to justify less
onerous regulations, such as the SEC regulations, and a future Supreme Court
could accept the rationale to support broader regulation as well.
I. THE STATE OF LOBBYING REGULATION AND JURISPRUDENCE
The details of federal, state, and local lobbying disclosure and tax rules are
byzantine and keep many lawyers in business. My purpose here is not to provide practical details for lobbying compliance.27 Rather, I aim to give the reader enough detail to understand roughly both the nature of lobbying regulation
(especially federal regulation) and the courts’ responses to constitutional challenges to such regulation.
A. The State of Lobbying Regulation
1. Federal disclosure laws and other early federal laws
Concerns about the role of lobbyists in influencing legislative bodies are
not new. Georgia, for example, outlawed lobbying of state legislators in its
1877 constitution,28 while in 1890 Massachusetts imposed a requirement that
lobbyists register and disclose their expenses incurred in state lobbying activity.29 Federal legislation took much longer to enact, and once enacted it was
hardly effective.
Political activists, members of the public, and reform-minded elected officials raised concerns about federal lobbying activity and the growth of government beginning with the Crédit Mobilier scandal during the Ulysses S. Grant
Administration.30 Periodic congressional investigations revealed unsavory lobbying practices. For example, a 1913 investigation into the activities of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) concluded:
NAM controlled some committee appointments, paid the chief page of the
House to report conversations by House Members on the floor and in the cloakroom, and enjoyed its own office in the Capitol. Less surprising, though still

27. An excellent resource to get started with practical registration and other requirements is THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12. Another very useful source is TREVOR
POTTER & JOSEPH M. BIRKENSTOCK, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, LOBBYING LAWS AND GIFT RULES
GUIDE (3d ed. 2008).
28. See Eskridge, supra note 12, at 7 n.7 (noting that criminal prohibitions on lobbying
survived under Georgia law until 1992). As Eskridge notes, such a requirement today would
“very probably be held to violate the First Amendment’s right to petition.” Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 7 & n.8.
30. Id. at 6-9.
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disturbing, were the large sums of money the lobbyists had at their disposal to
influence legislation.31

A 1935 congressional investigation uncovered what we would now term an
“astroturf” campaign,32 whereby utility companies paid for the sending of over
250,000 telegrams to Washington, written by utility company employees, and
often forging the signature of senders.33
Despite periodic scandal, investigation, and legislative proposals, Congress
passed no generally applicable federal lobbying bills until 1946, aside from a
short-lived lobbyist registration requirement that lasted only as long as the 44th
Congress.34 In 1946, Congress passed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying
Act35 “almost by accident”36 as part of a larger bill and without any legislative
hearings.37 The law imposed registration requirements for those who lobbied
Congress, as well as a requirement of quarterly reports of money spent and received for lobbying activities. But the law lacked “a workable enforcement mechanism”38 and it suffered from drafting problems that “resulted in a statute of
remarkable opaqueness”39 leading to “very uneven” compliance.40
The statute’s drafting problems proved to be its downfall. Responding to a
constitutional challenge to the statute (on the grounds that it was both fatally
vague under the Due Process Clause and a violation of the First Amendment),
the Supreme Court in United States v. Harriss41 significantly rewrote and narrowed the statute to avoid the vagueness problem, holding the rewritten statute
acceptable under the First Amendment.42 In rewriting the statute, the Court
“crippled an already frail statute”43 through an interpretation which “all but
ended” federal prosecutions under the statute.44
Though it was clear by the mid-1950s that the 1946 Act was ineffective as
a disclosure mechanism,45 it took another forty years before Congress imposed

31. Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
32. “Astroturfing” is “[a]n artificially-manufactured political movement designed to

give the appearance of grass roots activism.” Astroturfing, TAEGEN GODDARD’S POL.
DICTIONARY, http://politicaldictionary.com/words/astroturf (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
33. See Eskridge, supra note 12, at 8.
34. Id. at 7.
35. 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1994) (repealed 1995).
36. Eskridge, supra note 12, at 9.
37. See id. at 10.
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
42. Eskridge, supra note 12, at 12-14.
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id.
45. Susman and Luneburg identified five perceived weaknesses in the 1946 disclosure
regime, as rewritten by the Supreme Court in Harriss. See Susman & Luneburg, supra note
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new lobbying disclosure requirements. Although Congress passed the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA)46 on a unanimous vote of 421-0 in the
House and 98-0 in the Senate,47 the bill earlier faced serious Republican Party
opposition.48 It passed after, among other things, bill supporters affirmed that
the bill did not require disclosure by those engaged in “grassroots lobbying.”49
The LDA improved on the 1946 Act in a number of ways. It applies to lobbying of congressional staffs, and not just members of Congress; it covers executive branch lobbying;50 and it expands the scope of who needs to register as
a lobbyist and what information needs to be included in filed reports.51 The
LDA’s complex registration requirement52 is keyed to new definitions of “lobbyist,”53 “client,”54 “lobbying contact,”55 “lobbying activities,”56 and “communication.”57 Along with other federal laws,58 it provides the current framework for federal lobbying regulation.
Though the LDA certainly required more disclosure than the 1946 Act, it
was still a weak enforcement regime. “[T]he disclosures required by the Act are
minimal and are made in a format that is neither easily accessible nor decipher12, at 24. The authors trace the history of lobbying reform proposals over the forty-year period from 1955-1995. See id.
46. Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614
(2006 & Supp. I 2007)).
47. Adam Clymer, Congress Passes Bill to Disclose Lobbyists’ Roles, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1995, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/30/us/congress-passes
-bill-to-disclose-lobbyists-roles.html.
48. See id.; Adam Clymer, G.O.P. Filibuster Deals a Setback to Lobbying Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at A1; Katharine Q. Seelye, All-Out Strategy Hobbled Lobby Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at A22.
49. Susman & Luneburg, supra note 12, at 30-31.
50. More specifically, it applies to lobbying of a “covered executive branch official.”
William V. Luneburg & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995: Scope
of Coverage, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 43, 60-61.
51. For an overview of these LDA provisions, see id. at 48.
52. See id. at 45; see also William V. Luneburg & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Registration,
Quarterly Reporting, and Related Requirements, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12,
at 105. As to what must be included in reports, see William V. Luneburg, Semiannual Reports on Contributions and Disbursements by Registrants and Lobbyists, in THE LOBBYING
MANUAL, supra note 12, at 161.
53. See Luneburg & Spitzer, supra note 50, at 48-54.
54. See id. at 54-55.
55. See id. at 55-56.
56. See id. at 75-77.
57. See id. at 56-59.
58. Other significant federal lobbying laws include the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2006 & Supp. I 2007); see infra note 77, and the Byrd Amendment, 31 U.S.C. § 1352 (2006), which “prohibits the use of funds appropriated by Congress
to lobby for any type of a federal award—a federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative
agreement.” Thomas M. Susman, The Byrd Amendment, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra
note 12, at 349.
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able by average citizens.”59 Furthermore, “lobbyists need only state generally
that they contacted the House of Representatives or the Senate or a particular
federal agency, such as the Department of Energy at large, rather than specify
individual legislators, committees, or federal employees with whom they corresponded.”60 Congress amended the LDA in 2007 to marginally strengthen
disclosure requirements, penalties, and gift rules, and to make data accessible
for online searching.61
2. Federal tax laws
Federal tax laws have long touched lobbying activities. From 1915 to 1962,
the Treasury Department denied business income tax deductions for “lobbying
expenses.”62 An amendment to the Internal Revenue Code allowed for the deduction beginning in 1962,63 but in 1993, Congress repealed the deduction as to
certain lobbying expenses, including for “influencing legislation.”64
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code bars or limits certain § 501(c) organizations in their lobbying activities. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are very
limited in the amount of lobbying they may do without jeopardizing their taxexempt status.65 An organization that engages in prohibited lobbying loses its
tax exemption; moreover, donations to the organization are no longer deductible and the organization (and its managers) face additional excise taxes.66 Social welfare groups organized as § 501(c)(4) entities may operate as “action”
organizations and “may have, as a primary purpose, an aim that can be only ac59. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach
to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 520 (2007).
60. Id. at 521.
61. See infra Part I.A.3.
62. Timothy W. Jenkins & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Internal Revenue Code Limitations on
Deductibility of Lobbying Expenses by Businesses and Trade Associations, in THE LOBBYING
MANUAL, supra note 12, at 377, 377-78.
63. Id. at 378.
64. Id.
at 377, 380-81. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 defined “influencing legislation” as “any attempt to influence any legislation
through communication with any member or employee of a legislative body, or with any
government official or employee who may participate in the formulation of legislation.”
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13222(a), 107 Stat. 312,
478 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(4)(A) (2006)).
65. Under § 501(c)(3) “no substantial part of the activities of [the organization may include] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)).” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Subsection (h), in turn, gives
certain § 501(c)(3) organizations the option of using an “expenditure test” to allow the organization to make certain lobbying expenditures within dollar or formula limits. See id.
§ 501(h).
66. Timothy W. Jenkins & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Internal Revenue Code Limitations on
Lobbying by Tax-Exempt Organizations, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 393,
393-94.
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complished by legislation, and they may lobby without limit to accomplish
such a purpose.”67 However, candidate-related activity may not become the
“primary purpose” of the action organization,68 and since the enactment of the
LDA in 1995, § 501(c)(4) entities that engage in lobbying are ineligible for
federal awards, grants, and loans.69 Though § 501(c)(4) organizations are tax
exempt, contributions to such organizations are not deductible.70 Section
501(c)(3) organizations often form § 501(c)(4) affiliates to engage in lobbying
activities.71 Given these complex rules, tax scholars have devoted considerable
attention to the question of what constitutes “lobbying” for purposes of tax
laws.72
3. New federal laws and regulations (including Obama
Administration initiatives)
In 2007, Congress again revisited lobbying regulation, prompted in large
part by the Jack Abramoff scandal.
Among other exploits, Abramoff arranged lavish trips to the United Kingdom
and the South Pacific for [former House Majority Leader Tom] Delay; one
such outing involved an outlay of $70,000 to pay for Delay, his wife, and two
aides to visit Scotland and play golf at the famous St. Andrews Links. He also
allegedly enriched himself at the expense of various Native American tribes he
represented; at one point he worked both for and against a tribe with regard to
approval for a casino.73

Abramoff eventually “pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, tax evasion, and conspiracy to bribe public officials.”74 A “legislative stampede” followed.75

67. Id. at 397.
68. See Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Or-

ganizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 382 (2011).
69. Jenkins & Spitzer, supra note 66, at 400 n.52.
70. David C. Vladeck, Special Considerations for Lobbying by Nonprofit Corporations, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 401, 401-02.
71. “However, it is very important that the two entities be created and maintained as
separate and that the Section 501(c)(3) organization not subsidize the Section 501(c)(4) organization’s lobbying activities.” Jenkins & Spitzer, supra note 66, at 397. For the limits on
lobbying by other § 501(c) organizations, see id. at 397-98.
72. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 13; Vladeck, supra note 70, at 406-11.
73. Susman & Luneburg, supra note 12, at 32. For a detailed and colorful look, see also KAISER, supra note 23, at 16-20.
74. Susman & Luneburg, supra note 12, at 34. Regarding Abramoff’s downfall, Potter
and Birkenstock comment:
It is notable that despite the degree to which Abramoff and his associates are perceived to be
emblematic of the worst kinds of abuses of the lobbying profession, neither he nor any other
defendants from the private sector have even been charged with any violations of the LDA or
the Congressional ethics rules.

POTTER & BIRKENSTOCK, supra note 27, at 13 n.2. A more recent scandal emerged over lobbying work connected to the late Democratic representative John Murtha. See Eric Lichtblau,
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In 2007, Congress passed the Honest Leadership and Open Government
Act (HLOGA)76 in the wake of the Jack Abramoff scandal. HLOGA strengthened the LDA through “expanded disclosure of lobbying coalitions; a new
reporting system for lobbyist contributions and disbursements to or on behalf of
legislative and executive branch officials and candidates for federal office;
[and] improved public access to information disclosed under the LDA and the
Foreign Agents Registration Act.”77 HLOGA made reporting more frequent
and reports easier for the public to search, but it did not do anything to require
more detailed information about the specific members of Congress, staff, or
federal agency officials who were lobbied on particular bills or issues.78
HLOGA also (1) extended the waiting period from one year to two years
for senators (though not their staffers) to work as lobbyists;79 (2) required reports on lobbyists’ “bundling” of campaign contributions for federal candidates;80 and (3) banned gifts from lobbyists to members of Congress and staffers.81 The first requirement arguably caused Senator Trent Lott to retire from
the Senate earlier than planned, so that he could begin a major lobbyist venture
with former Senator John Breaux under a one-year, rather than two-year, wait-

Lobbyist Charged with Hiding Political Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/us/politics/06indict.html.
75. Susman & Luneburg, supra note 12, at 34-35.
76. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), Pub. L. No.
110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (codified in scattered sections of 2 and 18 U.S.C.).
77. Susman & Luneburg, supra note 12, at 37. For more on the requirements of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act, see Ronald I. Meltzer, Foreign Agents Registration Act, in
THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 307.
78. For an assessment of the limitations of the HLOGA disclosure requirements, see
William V. Luneburg, The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We Are Now
and Where We Should Be Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85 (2009).
79. See Robert G. Vaughn, Post-Employment Restrictions and the Regulation of Lobbying by Former Employees, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 525, 540-43.
80. For the details of the reporting requirements, see Trevor Potter & Matthew T. Sanderson, Lobbyist Bundling of Campaign Contributions, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra
note 12, at 471. Lobbyists also face reporting requirements related to political action committees (PACs) under their control. See Joseph E. Sandler, Lobbyists and Election Law: The
New Challenge, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 751, 763.
81. Congress has steadily limited the gifts that members of Congress can receive, with
somewhat different rules applying to House and Senate gifts. In HLOGA, both the House
and Senate barred most gifts from lobbyists, lobbying firms, and entities that employ or retain lobbyists. For a history, see Robert F. Bauer & Rebecca H. Gordon, Congressional Ethics: Gifts, Travel, Income, and Post-Employment Restrictions, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL,
supra note 12, at 477, 478-80. HLOGA also imposed new limitations on travel paid for by
lobbyists, see id. at 494-98, and honoraria and related outside income, see id. at 498-504. For
the limitations on gifts and outside compensation on executive branch officials, see Kathleen
Clark & Beth Nolan, Restrictions on Gifts and Outside Compensation for Executive Branch
Employees, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 513. There are also ethical rules
applying to lawyer lobbyists. See Thomas Ross, Ethics Law and the Lawyer/Lobbyist, in THE
LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 689.
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ing period.82 Representative Van Hollen explained that the basis for the bundling disclosure provision was to guard against the use of bundling by a lobbyist to enhance the lobbyist’s stature and thereby “exert an undue influence
over public policy.”83
After taking office in 2009, President Obama rolled out a series of new
lobbying regulations, which, among other things, provided that: (1) lobbyists
could not communicate orally with the administration regarding the economic
stimulus package;84 (2) absent a waiver, lobbyists could not serve as a presidential appointee;85 (3) no one working for the Obama Administration could
lobby the administration for the remainder of its term in office;86 and (4) lobbyists could not be appointed to federal advisory panels.87 These new rules
provoked controversy among lobbyists and others in Washington.
Facing some criticism of these lobbying rules,88 the administration
changed some aspects of the presidential directive on communications over the
stimulus package, applying it beyond registered lobbyists but narrowing the
time frame to which it applied.89 It defended its rules on presidential appoint-

82. Lott denied that this was why he left the Senate before the end of his term. See
Adam Nossiter & David M. Herszenhorn, Mississippi’s Lott to Leave Senate Seat Held Since
’88, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at A20.
83. Luneburg, supra note 78, at 112 (quoting 153 CONG. REC. H9209 (daily ed. July
31, 2007)).
84. Memorandum on Ensuring Responsible Spending of Recovery Act Funds, 2009
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 177 (Mar. 20, 2009).
85. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 3 C.F.R. 193 (2010), sets forth the rules, as well as the
provisions for obtaining a waiver. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 44 (2010 Supp.) (discussing Obama administration waivers);
see also Richard W. Painter, President Obama’s Progress in Government Ethics, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 195, 200 (2010) (discussing the difficulty of crafting a good waiver policy). The
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recently released for notice and comment a proposed final guidance to put this policy into place. See Proposed Guidance on Appointment of
Lobbyists to Federal Boards and Commissions, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,397 (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-27621.pdf. Lobbyists reacted negatively
to the OMB announcement. See Kevin Bogardus, Lobbyists Group Denounces OMB Guidance to Ban K Street from Boards, HILL ON MONEY (Nov. 24, 2010 3:04 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/personnel-notes/130683-lobbyists-group-blasts-omb
-guidance-to-ban-k-street-from-advisory-boards.
86. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 85, at 45. For an overview of the Obama initiatives,
see James A. Thurber, Changing the Way Washington Works? Assessing President Obama’s
Battle with Lobbyists, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 358 (2011).
87. Memorandum on Lobbyists on Agency Boards and Commissions, 2010 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 513 (June 18, 2010).
88. See Painter, supra note 85, at 201-03 (discussing lobbyists’ dissatisfaction with the
rules and with Norm Eisen, then the President’s chief ethics counsel).
89. See Norm Eisen, Update on Recovery Act Lobbying Rules: New Limits on Special
Interest Influence, WHITE HOUSE (May 29, 2009, 5:35 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/Update-on-Recovery-Act-Lobbying-Rules-New-Limits-on-Special-Interest-Influence;
Josh Gerstein, WH Expands, Narrows Stimulus Lobbying Ban, POLITICO (May 29, 2009,
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ments by stating that the concern prompting the rule was “not about the few
corrupt lobbyists or specific abuses by the profession, but rather . . . the system
as a whole. For too long, lobbyists and those who can afford their services have
held disproportionate influence over national policy making.”90 The policies
were geared to “level the playing field” so that “all Americans and not just
those with access to money or power” would have Washington address their
concerns,91 and to “reduc[e] the undue influence of special interests.”92
4. The variety of state lobbying laws
States vary widely in their approach to lobbying. Many states have long
imposed limitations or bans on campaign contributions, at least during some
time periods, by lobbyists to elected officials.93 A few states bar lobbyists from
serving in fundraising roles in campaigns.94 Forty-three states ban contingentfee lobbying, whereby lobbyists receive a percentage of any contracts a lobbyist helps procure for a client.95 Many states also impose some kind of antirevolving-door provision. These vary along three dimensions: the length of
time for which they apply (typically one or two years following government
service), the nature of the lobbying restriction (sometimes the restrictions are
limited only to matters in which the elected official or staff member was involved while in government), and whether it applies only to lobbying for compensation.96

11:31
PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0509/WH_expands_narrows
_stimulus_lobbying_ban.html.
90. Norm Eisen, A Washington That Is More Reflective of All of America, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 9, 2009, 5:10 PM EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/11
?page=5.
91. Id.
92. Memorandum on Lobbyists on Agency Boards and Commissions, supra note 87,
at 1.
93. See Sandler, supra note 80, at 756-57.
94. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(8) (2011).
95. See 50 State Chart: Contingency Fees, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec.
2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=15351. On the complicated federal approach
to contingent-fee lobbying, see Thomas M. Susman & Margaret H. Martin, Contingent-Fee
Lobbying, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 669. For an argument against the
constitutionality of banning such lobbying, see Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note,
Protecting the Right to Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee Prohibition Violates the
Constitution, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559 (1998).
96. For details, see Memorandum from Jason Campbell to author, Lobbying Regulations and the Constitution (Aug. 25, 2010) (on file with author).
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5. Proposals for additional lobbying regulations
After a year of deliberations, a bipartisan task force of lawyers, lobbyists,
academics, and representatives from public interest organizations, organized by
the ABA Administrative Law Section, recommended changes in federal lobbying law.97 Significantly, the task force recommended “that an individual lobbyist should be prohibited from conducting certain fundraising activity to support the campaign of any Member of Congress, or candidate for Congress, with
whom that lobbyist has made a ‘lobbying contact’ within the past two years.”98
Further, though lobbyists could continue to contribute to candidates, “a lobbyist’s biennial aggregate contributions should be limited to half of the
amounts allowed to other citizens by this statutory framework.”99 Apollonio et
al. similarly advocate a ban on lobbyist fundraising.100 They further advocate
that the government provide public funding “for lobbyists that represent diffuse, non-corporate interests.”101 Heather Gerken and Alex Tausanovitch have
expanded on this idea, arguing for public subsidies of lobbying activities as a
means of leveling up.102 Finally, Senator Rand Paul has proposed that Congress
97. See TASK FORCE ON FED. LOBBYING LAWS, ABA, LOBBYING LAW IN THE
SPOTLIGHT: CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS (2011) [hereinafter ABA TASK
FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011
_build/administrative_law/lobbying_task_force_report_010311.authcheckdam.pdf.
98. Id. at 20. “[C]overed ‘fundraising’ activity would include hosting or organizing
fundraising events, serving on a campaign fundraising committee, sending communications
(phone, print, email) soliciting contributions for the Member’s campaign, or participating in
the ‘bundling’ of campaign contributions for the Member’s campaign.” Id.
99. Id. at 21. The report continues: “If a limitation on the size of lobbyists’ donations
to individual campaigns should prove necessary, as a practical matter, in order to implement
these aggregate caps effectively, that step should also be considered.” Id. The ABA Administrative Law Section voted to strip this provision from the recommendations sent on to the
ABA House of Delegates. In the summer of 2011, the ABA House of Delegates voted to
adopt a resolution based on the task force’s recommendations. Among other things, the ABA
advocated that Congress bar federally registered lobbyists from “engag[ing] in campaign
fundraising for a member of Congress whom he or she has lobbied during the past two
years.” House of Delegates, Resolution 104B: Urges Strengthening of Federal Lobby Laws,
ABANOW (2011), http://www.abanow.org/2011/07/2011am104b.
100. See Dorie Apollonio et al., Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption
Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 48 (2008); see also KAISER, supra note 23, at 357
(“Congress could ban any registered lobbyist and any institution that hires a registered lobbyist from raising or soliciting contributions for federal candidates and officeholders.”); id.
at 358 (advocating lengthening anti-revolving-door provisions); RICHARD W. PAINTER,
GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: HOW ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE A
DIFFERENCE 257 (2009) (“It is, however, meaningless to criminalize buying a fifty-dollar
lunch or cigarbox for a lawmaker, yet allow a lobbyist to raise $50,000 in campaign contributions for the same lawmaker and invite clients to meet the lawmaker. Prohibiting the former may even be a smokescreen for ignoring the latter.”).
101. Apollonio et al., supra note 100, at 48.
102. See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign
Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1165-67 (2011).
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include in all government contracts worth at least $1 million a clause barring
the contractor from engaging in any lobbying activities or making campaign
contributions.103
B. Constitutional Jurisprudence Concerning Lobbying Regulation
1. The traditional approach of the courts104
The Supreme Court has rarely had to address issues related to lobbying.
When it has, it has done so in the context of First Amendment free speech challenges to disclosure law or tax law.105 Only lower courts have addressed the
constitutionality of other lobbying regulations.
a.

Disclosure

The Court has held that government-compelled disclosure of lobbying information is generally constitutional. In United States v. Harriss,106 the Court,
after narrowly construing the 1946 Lobbying Act,107 held that the state’s interest in providing information to legislators justified the disclosure require-

103. See Paul, supra note 7, at 35.
104. This Subpart draws upon the history of lobbying regulation recounted in Ellen P.

Aprill & Richard L. Hasen, Lobbypalooza, AM. INT., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 62, available at
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=911.
105. There has been considerable academic commentary on the meaning and reach of
the Petition Clause in the First Amendment. See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment
Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993); Steven A. Browne, Note, The Constitutionality of Lobbying Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy and the Right to Petition the Government, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717 (1995); Fatka & Levien, supra note 95. The Supreme Court
thus far has not viewed the Petition Clause as providing any greater or different protection
than the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479
(1985). However, the Court recently clarified that point:
This Court’s opinion in McDonald v. Smith has sometimes been interpreted to mean that
the right to petition can extend no further than the right to speak; but McDonald held only
that speech contained within a petition is subject to the same standards for defamation and libel as speech outside a petition. . . . There may arise cases where the special concerns of the
Petition Clause would provide a sound basis for a distinct analysis; and if that is so, the rules
and principles that define the two rights might differ in emphasis and formulation.

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) (citation omitted). On claims
that the Petition Clause requires greater constitutional protection for lobbying activities, see,
for example, Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149 (1993). See also Jan Witold Baran, Can I Lobby You? Don’t Let One Bad Abramoff Spoil the Whole Bunch, WASH. POST,
Jan. 8, 2006, at B1.
106. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1734428

210

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:191

ments.108 While Harriss relied on the state’s interest in providing information
to lawmakers about lobbying activities as a rationale for disclosure law, today
that rationale “is at best a secondary consideration.”109 Indeed, the LDA “findings” do not mention this interest,110 focusing instead on public awareness of
lobbyist activities and public confidence.111 Congress found that “effective
public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase
public confidence in the integrity of Government.”112 Practically speaking,
challenges to lobbying disclosure laws today are unlikely to rely on the Harriss
discussion (with its endorsement of an equality rationale no doubt undermined
by Citizens United) and are more likely to be decided under campaign finance
law jurisprudence about disclosure.113 Garrett et al. conclude that the disclosure
provisions of the LDA are likely constitutional under the anticorruption, appearance of corruption, and information interests recognized in the campaign
finance disclosure cases.114
Recently, the Supreme Court in Citizens United cited approvingly to Harriss’s upholding of lobbying disclosure rules.115 In addition, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a challenge the

108. The Court stated:
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress cannot
be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full
realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no
small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the
people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking
favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal. This is the evil
which the Lobbying Act was designed to help prevent.

Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625. The Court further rejected hypothetical claims that the Act would
deter individuals from engaging in lobbying. Id. at 626.
109. Elizabeth Garrett et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by the Lobbying Disclosure
Act, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 12, at 197, 198.
110. See id.
111. See 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
112. Id.
113. See Garrett et al., supra note 109, at 198.
114. Id. at 201. They suggest that had the LDA or HLOGA extended to grassroots lobbying, it would have presented a closer constitutional question. Id. at 205. Further, they believe that groups facing harassment for their lobbying activities might be entitled to an “asapplied” exemption from disclosure provisions, analogous to the exemption recognized in
campaign finance law. See id. at 206-08; see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821
(2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010). Ironically, an attack on the disclosure rules would most likely succeed by focusing on the ineffectiveness of the lobbying
rules. See Garrett et al., supra note 109, at 207-08.
115. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915 (“[T]he Court has upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself.”);
see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 n.20 (1995) (“The activities
of lobbyists who have direct access to elected representatives, if undisclosed, may well
present the appearance of corruption.”).
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National Association of Manufacturers brought to a disclosure provision of
HLOGA.116 That provision requires disclosure by any organization that contributes more than $5000 and actively participates in another organization’s lobbying efforts.117 The appeals court held that the government had a compelling
interest in revealing to the public those who were behind the funding of lobbying activities.118 Following well-trodden campaign finance law, the court held
that a group could be entitled to an as-applied exemption from disclosure requirements if it could demonstrate that it would be subject to government or
other harassment for revealing its lobbying activities.119
b. Tax laws
The Supreme Court has issued three major opinions at the intersection of
tax law and lobbying law. In Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,120
the Court upheld a Treasury Department regulation barring the deduction of
lobbying costs as a business expense. It found that the regulation did not “contravene[] any Congressional policy. Contracts to spread such insidious influences through legislative halls have long been condemned.”121 Eighteen years
later, in Cammarano v. United States,122 the Court rejected, among other arguments, a First Amendment challenge to nondeductibility rules for business lobbying expenses. “Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they
engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to
pay for those activities entirely out of their own pockets . . . .”123 The Court explained that the tax treatment was valid based upon Congress’s determination
that “since purchased publicity can influence the fate of legislation which will
affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community
should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as the Treasury
of the United States is concerned.”124
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,125 a nonprofit
ideological group that wished to engage in lobbying activities but keep its
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status argued that the lobbying prohibition on such
groups violated its First Amendment rights. Explaining that both tax exemptions and tax deductions are a form of government subsidy, the Supreme Court

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
Taylor, 582 F.3d at 16.
Id. at 20-21.
314 U.S. 326 (1941).
Id. at 338 (footnote omitted).
358 U.S. 498 (1959).
Id. at 513.
Id.
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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held that there was no First Amendment violation. Relying on its earlier opinion in Cammarano, the Court held that Congress’s failure to subsidize lobbying through its tax laws did not amount to a First Amendment violation:
It appears that Congress was concerned that exempt organizations might use
tax-deductible contributions to lobby to promote the private interests of their
members. It is not irrational for Congress to decide that tax-exempt charities
. . . should not further benefit at the expense of taxpayers at large by obtaining
a further subsidy for lobbying.126

Lloyd Mayer believes that “all of the federal laws governing lobbying and
lobbyists appear now to share a common purpose: to limit both the actual and
perceived influence of interest groups on government actions.”127 Mayer further explains that the government’s interest in “ensuring a level playing field
for all those seeking to influence government action by any branch, a purpose
that has been cited in the past with respect to at least the tax rules[,] . . . appears
to have been supplanted by interest group influence concerns, particularly in
recent years.”128
c.

Other lobbying laws

Though the Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of other
types of lobbying laws, lower courts have ruled upon a number of challenges.
In the past, most courts have tended to uphold lobbying regulations. Courts
have upheld bans on lobbyist contributions to legislators,129 bans on lobbyist

126. Id. at 550 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun, for himself and Justices Brennan
and Marshall, stated his belief that lobbying is an activity protected by the First Amendment,
and that the only reason the tax provision did not impose an unconstitutional condition upon
§ 501(c)(3) organizations is the ease with which they could create a § 501(c)(4) affiliate. Id.
at 551-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
127. Mayer, supra note 13, at 507-08.
128. Id. at 508.
129. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying
strict scrutiny, and upholding North Carolina ban on lobbyist contributions to legislators during legislative sessions); Preston v. Leake, 743 F. Supp. 2d 501 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (applying
closely drawn scrutiny, and upholding ban on lobbyist contributions to state legislators),
aff’d, 660 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2011); Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (applying closely drawn scrutiny, and
upholding ban on lobbyist contributions to candidates for offices the lobbyist is registered to
lobby); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999) (applying closely
drawn scrutiny, and upholding ban on lobbyist contributions to members of assembly except
allowing contributions to candidates in lobbyist’s home district); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665
A.2d 44 (Vt. 1995) (applying closely drawn scrutiny, and upholding Vermont ban on contributions to assembly members during legislative session). But see Fair Political Practices
Comm’n v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1979) (applying closely drawn scrutiny, and
holding a broad ban on lobbyist contributions to all state elected officials unconstitutional).
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contingency fees,130 anti-revolving-door statutes,131 and restrictions on lobbyists serving on campaign committees132 or bundling campaign contributions.133
2. The changing tide: constitutional jurisprudence concerning
lobbying regulation in a post-Citizens United world
The Court’s shifting interpretation of First Amendment speech rights, and
in particular its campaign finance jurisprudence, are beginning to have an effect
on how lower courts have considered challenges to lobbying restrictions.
Though it is early in the development of this jurisprudence, there are signs that
many new and proposed lobbying regulations going beyond disclosure could
fail to survive constitutional scrutiny under the traditional anticorruption justification.
This is not the place to canvass the details of the seismic shift in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.134 It is enough here to note that
in a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has expressed deep skepticism
about the constitutionality of limits on the use of money to influence political
outcomes. Of these cases, the most important one is Citizens United v. FEC,135
in which the Court endorsed in dicta a very stingy definition of corruption that
excludes ingratiation and the sale of access, and rejected the idea that political
equality could justify regulations limiting political speech.136 Both of these
conclusions endanger lobbying regulations that reach beyond disclosure rules
(or tax law), as two recent lower court cases show.
In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,137 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down two provisions of Connecticut law
related to lobbyists. First, the court, applying closely drawn scrutiny, struck
130. See, e.g., Fla. League of Prof’l Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir.
1996); Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Ky. 1995). But
see Mont. Auto. Ass’n v. Greely 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont. 1981) (striking down Montana
anti-contingency-fee law on First Amendment grounds).
131. See United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1973).
132. See Md. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Weathersbee, 975 F. Supp.
791, 797 (D. Md. 1997) (applying strict scrutiny, and upholding law barring lobbyists from
serving on political fundraising committees).
133. See Preston, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 503, 508-09 (applying closely drawn scrutiny, and
upholding North Carolina state law that banned both lobbyist contributions to state candidates as well as lobbyist bundling activities). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the law
banning lobbyist contributions but did not address the ban on lobbyist bundling contained in
the law. See Preston, 660 F.3d 726.
134. For my most recent distillation, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011).
135. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
136. See id. at 910, 913; see also id. at 919-24 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
137. 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010).
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down as a First Amendment violation a ban on campaign contributions to stateelected officials imposed on state-registered lobbyists and their families.138
Contrasting the state’s extensive evidence of corruption related to government
contractors, which the court said justified the state’s ban on contributions by
contractors and their families, the court held the evidence of actual corruption
insufficient as to lobbyists. Relying on Citizens United, the court rejected evidence suggesting that the public “generally distrust[s] lobbyists and the ‘special
attention’ they are believed to receive from elected officials.”139 Further,
“[i]nfluence and access . . . are not sinister in nature.”140 The court concluded
that a limit, rather than ban, on lobbyist contributions would “adequately address” anticorruption concerns.141
The court similarly rejected a law banning lobbyists from collecting campaign contributions for elected officials. Again relying on recent Supreme
Court campaign finance cases, the court held that this was a ban on speech,
subject to strict scrutiny.142 The court then held that under Citizens United the
anticorruption interest was not a compelling interest which could justify limitations on spending.143 Further, and again relying on Citizens United, the court
rejected the idea that “an individual might secure a political favor by recommending that another person make a campaign contribution.”144
After noting that the district court had upheld the antisolicitation provision
on the grounds that a lobbyist or contractor might “organize a large fundraising
event in exchange for a candidate’s assistance in securing a lucrative state contract,”145 the court noted that there were “good reasons to think that the threat
of bundling does not provide a compelling justification for the solicitation bans,
especially with regard to lobbyists.”146 It held that in any case the law was not
narrowly tailored because it prohibited not just organized bundling activities
but also “small-scale solicitation efforts” including a lobbyist recommending to
his mother to make a contribution to a state candidate.147 Further, if the prob-

Id. at 205-07.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. (“Whatever may be said about whether money is speech, speech is speech, even
if it is speech about money.” (citation omitted)).
143. Id. at 208-09. On this point, it appears that the court misread Citizens United. The
Supreme Court held that independent spending could not corrupt or create the appearance of
corruption, not that corruption was an insufficient interest to justify such limits. See Hasen,
supra note 134, at 596.
144. Green Party, 616 F.3d at 208.
145. Id. at 209.
146. Id.
147. Id.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
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lem with bundled lobbyist contributions was the danger of solicitation from
clients, the law could have more narrowly addressed only those solicitations.148
In Brinkman v. Budish,149 a federal district court, applying strict scrutiny,
struck down on First Amendment grounds a law barring former members of the
state assembly and their staff from lobbying the state assembly. Relying on Citizens United, the court held that, as applied to lobbying for compensation, the
anti-revolving-door statute could potentially be justified on anticorruption
grounds. But uncompensated lobbying could not be justified on anticorruption
grounds or on the alternative grounds of “level[ing] the playing field,” a justification tantamount to an equality argument which has been rejected by the Supreme Court.150 As to compensated lobbying, the court held the Ohio law was
not narrowly tailored to the prevention of corruption. First, the court held the
state did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the basis for a twelvemonth limitation. “Defendants have not established that the danger of quid pro
quo corruption or the appearance of corruption is significantly lessened if the
former legislator is permitted to lobby the General Assembly one year and one
day after leaving the legislature.”151 Second, the statute was too broad in covering matters regardless of whether the former official or staff member had personally participated in formulating policy on the issue and “had the opportunity
to gain ‘inside’ information.”152 Further, the law applied to both compensated
and uncompensated lobbying,153 and it was underinclusive in not restricting
“other behaviors or activities . . . that might give rise to actual or perceived corruption, such as the acceptance of gifts or offers for employment unrelated to
lobbying.”154
These two cases show the difficulty of relying upon the traditional anticorruption interest to justify lobbying regulations that go beyond disclosure or
special tax treatment for lobbying. To be sure, not all courts will follow Green
Party and Brinkman. Certainly there are ways courts could write reasonable

Id.
692 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 865.
Id.
Id. The State of Ohio did not appeal this ruling. See Jim Siegel, State Won’t Appeal
Ruling Tossing Out Lobbying Law, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 4, 2010, at 8B, available at
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2010/05/04/state-wont-appeal
-lobbying-law-ruling.html. Writing before Citizens United, the Supreme Court of Oregon
struck down a ban on lobbyists offering gifts to elected officials under the state constitution’s
freedom of expression protections. Vannatta v. Or. Gov’t Ethics Comm’n, 222 P.3d 1077
(Or. 2009). However, the court upheld a ban on elected officials receiving gifts from lobbyists. Id.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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opinions upholding various lobbying regulations on anticorruption grounds.155
In addition, the Second Circuit in Green Party suggested that more narrowly
tailored bundling laws possibly could pass muster, and that laws passed with
additional evidence of actual corruption facilitated by lobbyists could justify
laws banning lobbyist contributions. But these first two post-Citizens United
cases should be viewed like canaries in a coal mine, signaling that lobbying
laws that were once seen as easily passing constitutional muster now face a potentially difficult path.
Equality arguments to justify lobbying regulations are likely to fare even
worse in the post-Citizens United world, even though some of the earlier Supreme Court tax cases seemed to recognize an equality interest in lobbying regulation.156 For all the talk from Obama and his former ethics czar Norm Eisen
about lobbying laws being justified by a desire to “level the playing field,”157
and for all of Sarah Palin’s complaints about the “smaller competitors left out
in the cold” by the lobbying of the “big players,”158 it seems unlikely that new
lobbying regulations could now pass muster under a political equality (or antidistortion) rationale. Indeed, to the extent courts care about government intent
in passing lobbying regulation,159 equality talk justifying lobbying regulations
decreases the chances that such laws would be upheld.
II. THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC WELFARE RATIONALE FOR LOBBYING
REGULATION
A. How Lobbying Works: Lessons from Political Science
The national economic welfare rationale for lobbying regulation depends
upon a clear understanding of how lobbying works and its effects on the economy. An understanding of lobbying is a prerequisite to a fair evaluation of potential state interests to justify regulation, as well as to an evaluation of the tailoring of such regulation to the government’s interests.

155. See, e.g., Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 734-35 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Green
Party while upholding the statute at issue), aff’g 743 F. Supp. 2d 501, 507-08 (E.D.N.C.
2010) (same).
156. Cf. Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together,
19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 113 (2008) (writing before the Citizens United case that
compared to the campaign finance arena, “[p]olitical equality plays a far smaller role in lobbying regulation”); id. at 114 (explaining that the equality concerns in the lobbying arena are
less about the “political equality of individuals per se” and more about “fair competition
among contending interest groups”).
157. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
159. On why courts should not, see Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 843.
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Politicians on the left and right both have excoriated lobbyists as “corrupt”
or as gaining unfair advantage in the political marketplace. Yet these politicians
usually leave unsaid how lobbyists gain their Svengali-like influence. The unstated model of the “black box” is that of an ideal and distorted legislative
process. The ideal model imagines a typical civic republican view of the political process.160 Legislators come into a legislative debate with a set of preferences about ideal public policy. They are influenced, but not overly so, by the
views of their constituents. Exercising independent judgment in line with the
common good, legislators deliberate about the best public policy. Legislative
outputs accurately reflect the outcome of reasoned debate, and promote the
common good. A variation of this ideal views legislative preferences as driven
less by reasoned deliberation and preexisting preferences and more by a politician’s desire to be reelected through pleasing the median voter. This changes
the model so that ideal legislative outputs come closer to representing the median voter’s view of idealized public policy rather than the legislators’ own preferences.
In the model of the legislative process distorted by lobbyists, again legislators come into the legislative debate with a set of preferences about ideal public
policy, and they take voter preferences into account in considering their position on legislation. Alternatively, legislators are faithful agents of the median
voter in their jurisdictions. Lobbyists then somehow, magically, skew the political process. The result is that legislative outputs no longer reflect the outcome
of reasoned debate, promoting the common good, or the preferences of the median voters. Instead, public policy reflects the preferences of lobbyists’ clients.
The “corruption” variant of lobbyist influence views lobbyists as bribing
politicians to change their position, through either personal or political gifts.
Among the important political gifts are campaign contributions. This popular
view is reflected not only in the words of politicians referring to lobbyists as a
“criminal class,”161 but also in typical formalized public choice models of the
legislative process. Such models assume that politicians seeking to maximize
their chances of reelection will alter their legislative actions (such as votes,
committee hearings, and drafting of legislative language) in response to the receipt of campaign contributions, often from lobbyists, which are used to help
insure reelection.162
160. For a summary of civic republican ideas, see the sources cited in Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign
Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11 n.37 (1996).
161. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding
Lobbyists and Caps on Political Contributions, 145 PUB. CHOICE 81, 84-85 (2010) (concluding that a cap on lobbyist contributions induces a politician to be more likely to enact the
policy he would have enacted in the absence of lobbying, because there would be fewer contributions which would be large enough to sway the politician from his sincerely held position); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group
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The “equality/distortion” version of lobbyist influence is less clear in its
causal methodology. Under Sarah Palin’s explanation, the wealthy can more
easily afford lobbyists, who “work the regulations” in their favor and ply influence through large campaign contributions.163 Similarly, the Obama Administration defended its new lobbying regulations as “leveling the playing field”
based upon a similar view of the lobbyist skew.164 The equality/distortion rationale, while overlapping somewhat with the corruption explanation, does not
depend upon elected officials (or executive agency personnel) being corruptly
influenced by personal or political gifts, that is, by making a conscious decision
to vote against the politician’s views of ideal public policy because of a gift.
Instead, the implicit assumption of this model seems to be that these officials
respond to the sheer amount of lobbyist contact, perhaps as a proxy for the public intensity of preference on particular issues, and the more contact from lobbyists on a political point, the more likely the officials are to adopt the lobbyist
position. Because the wealthy can afford more lobbyists, the wealthy get more
public policy in their favor through buying more lobbyist stimuli.
Lobbyists, of course, tend to deny the existence of a skew caused by corruption or inequality. They argue that lobbyists influence the political process
merely by the provision of specialized information which assists legislative deliberation, so that legislators make more informed policy decisions consistent
with the public good.165
Political scientists have been studying the lobbying process for many decades, and the nuanced picture that emerges bears only a slight resemblance to
all of these popular depictions. To begin with, political scientists studying current politics have uncovered very little evidence of actual lobbyist quid pro quo
corruption, where dollars from lobbyists are expressly bartered for political favors from elected officials or staffers.166 To be sure, some celebrated instances
of lobbyist corruption remain, whereby a lobbyist actually bribes elected officials to take legislative action (in the form of votes or other legislative influence) to favor the interests of the lobbyist’s client. The Abramoff case is only
the most prominent recent case of actual (but rare) lobbyist corruption. Despite
popular rhetoric, nothing indicates that lobbyist corruption is rampant, or even
commonplace, and so long as law enforcement officials adequately enforce ex-

Politics, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1089, 1098-99 (2010) (using a formal model of lobbyist influence, and noting that in addition to campaign contributions, “[l]obbying groups can provide
positions or business opportunities to associates, family members, or friends of the politician, give charitable contributions to causes favored by or helpful to the politician by supporting positions the politician seeks to advance, and so forth”).
163. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
165. On the information theory, see below note 171 and accompanying text.
166. In the past, actual corruption was much more common. See supra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text.
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isting antibribery laws, laws barring conduit contributions (whereby one person
passes money to another to contribute to a candidate), and disclosure laws, lobbyist corruption is likely to remain uncommon. It has become difficult for lobbyists to bribe elected officials and staffers without violating another law
whose violation is more easily detected, thanks to campaign finance laws and
the tightening of the gift and travel bans in HLOGA.167
Beyond instances of corruption, political scientists have studied how lobbyists work and how much influence they have. Though there is some
longstanding disagreement among scholars over the strength of lobbyist influence over legislative outcomes,168 the following is a thumbnail sketch of the
collective political science wisdom on how lobbyists achieve influence. Then,
in Part II.B, I address the extent and direction of any lobbyist skew of public
policy.
1. How lobbyists achieve influence
Clients employ lobbyists to try to influence public policy on a particular issue in a certain direction. Lobbyists use a variety of tools to achieve such influence, including mobilizing individual citizens to contact legislators (grassroots
lobbying), testifying at hearings, submitting written comments to an agency or
committee, press releases, and other activities.169 But lobbyists’ most important
tool is personal contact with legislators and staff members.170 A lobbyist with
167. See supra note 81.
168. Two classic works examining the role of lobbyists both involve issues of foreign

trade. E.E. Schattschneider paints a picture of lobbyists as able to skew public policy on
trade in significant ways. See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF
(1935). Raymond Bauer et al. are more skeptical about lobbyists’ effectiveness in pursuing
their clients’ aims. See RAYMOND A. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1963).
169. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS,
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 151 tbl.8.1 (2009) (summarizing various methods by which federal
lobbyists worked to achieve their policy goals); see also ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL
LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT (AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT) 18 (2006) (discussing a
study of thirty-four lobbyists on the federal, state, and local level); KAY LEHMAN
SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 148
(1986) (representing an earlier study discussing lobbying tactics used to influence Congress).
170. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 152 (“Most notable is the wide range
of tactics used and the high frequency with which advocates on all sides work with congressional staff, members, and legislative allies in general.”); id. at 151 tbl.8.1 (indicating that
80.6% of lobbyists in the study reported engaging in “[p]ersonal contact with rank-and-file
members of Congress or staff”); NOWNES, supra note 169, at 200 (“[M]ost lobbyists tend to
come back to the ‘old favorites’: meeting personally with legislators and their aides and with
bureaucrats.”); id. at 213-15 (discussing lobbyists’ reliance on personal meetings). Citizens
report using similar tools when engaging in local lobbying. See BRIAN E. ADAMS, CITIZEN
LOBBYISTS: LOCAL EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY 134 tbl.7.1 (2007) (showing that
100% of citizen lobbyists surveyed list “[s]peak with an elected official” among political
activities they have engaged in to influence local government action).
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access to a legislator is in the best position to influence public policy. Once a
lobbyist secures access, she influences policy primarily by providing credible
information to a legislator or staffer to argue for a particular legislative action.
Lobbyists have a number of incentives to provide credible information.
Lobbyists are involved in iterated play with elected officials and staffers. A
lobbyist who is not credible will not be listened to in the future. Thus, even if
clients wish for lobbyists to provide information that is not credible to elected
officials and staffers, it is in the lobbyist’s own long-term interest in securing
future clients to maintain good relationships with elected officials and staffers
by providing credible information. In this instance, the principal-agent dispute
between lobbyist and client makes it more likely that lobbyists provide credible
information.171
Though a common (mis)understanding of lobbying is that lobbyists change
legislators’ positions on a particular legislative issue through favors or threats,
such change appears relatively rare. Instead, the lobbyist’s usual role is to provide support and useful information for a position a legislator already holds.172
At other times, the issue of interest to the lobbyist (and her client) is one about
which the legislator has no firm position, or even knowledge, and one about
which the public is not paying any attention. In such circumstances the legislator is often willing to help a friendly lobbyist achieve her client’s interests, especially when the client is a constituent or has business affecting the legislator’s district.173
Lobbyists rarely can sway resistant legislators on high-salience issues
about which the public appears to be paying a great deal of attention. Birnbaum
and Murray, for example, describe in painstaking detail how even the most
highly paid professional lobbyists were unable to derail a large corporate tax
increase which became part of the politically popular Tax Reform Act of 1986,
a major tax bill passed during the Reagan Administration with bipartisan support.174 And though Baumgartner et al. used the example of the student loan

171. Cf. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 135-36 (explaining that for lobbyists,
“credibility comes first”); Scott Ainsworth, The Logic and Rationale of Lobbying Regulations, 23 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1, 7 (1996). For a general discussion of principal-agent
problems between clients and lobbyists, see Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E. Jackson,
Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2010).
172. For a careful exploration of this role, see Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff,
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (2006).
173. See John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying, 49 J.L. & ECON. 597 (2006) (finding universities in districts with a representative on the House or Senate appropriations committees were more successful at obtaining government earmarks than those not represented, and that lobbying committee members
in favor of other universities had only limited benefits).
174. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
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program as one in which the public interest appeared to have been scuttled by
lobbyists for the banking industry,175 when the issue of student loan reform became a priority for the Obama Administration, industry lobbyists eventually
were unable to stop fundamental change to the program.176
Rather than working primarily to change legislative minds on issues of
high public salience, lobbyists, like mushrooms, thrive in areas of low light.177
As Birnbaum and Murray show, once it became apparent that the 1986 tax bill
was going to pass, lobbyists were much more successful in working to get favorable treatment for their clients in the details of the bill and its implementation.178 A similar phenomenon occurred with the recent passage of the financial
reform bill. Though opponents of the bill just barely failed in getting the bill
scuttled,179 they worked fervently with legislative and executive agency staffers to seek advantage as staffers hashed out the details of the bill’s implementation and its accompanying regulations.180
The more general lesson appears to be that lobbyists are most likely to be
successful when (1) they have direct access to legislative officials and their
staff, (2) they are working on issues of lower salience, and (3) the legislators
being lobbied are either already in agreement with the position of the lobbyist
or are indifferent about the policy proposals of the lobbyists.
2. Securing access
Lobbyists gain access through the cultivation of relationships with legislators and staffers using a variety of tools permissible under the law,181 especially
the raising of campaign contributions for legislators. Campaign contributions

175. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 239-40; see also Eric Lichtblau, Industry
Lobbying Imperils Obama Overhaul of Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A1.
176. Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
03/31/us/politics/31obama.html (“Mr. Obama portrayed the overhaul of the student loan
program as a triumph over an ‘army of lobbyists,’ singling out Sallie Mae, the nation’s largest student lender, which he said spent $3 million on lobbying to stop the changes.”).
177. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 120-21 (discussing the relationship
of issue salience to lobbyist success).
178. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 174, at 236-37 (“With tax reform clearly on its
way to passage, the most savvy lobbyists decided it was time to jump on board. . . . The most
virulent opponents of the effort became born-again reformers. . . . The high-sounding rhetoric masked the real reason for supporting the bill—it was the lobbyists’ last chance to save
themselves and at least some of their favorite tax breaks.”).
179. Edward Wyatt & Eric Lichtblau, A Finance Overhaul Fight Draws a Lobbying
Swarm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at A1.
180. Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/business/
27regulate.html.
181. NOWNES, supra note 169, at 17-19.
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are a key part of a culture of reciprocity.182 Feelings of reciprocity are formed
easily and without the outlay of considerable resources,183 but those who help
out the most are likely to get the greatest access. It is a natural instinct to help
someone who has helped you. In this context, why shouldn’t a legislator help a
lobbyist supporter by favoring her client’s interests on an issue about which the
legislator has no personal preference?184
Lobbyists typically do not raise campaign contributions for any and all legislators.185 Republican lobbyists raise funds for Republicans and Democratic
lobbyists raise funds for Democrats—though often such lobbyists are in the
same firm as a means of hedging against future political change and having the
ability to work both sides of the aisle in Congress.186 Lobbying and fundraising
patterns follow the fortunes of the parties in Congress. Following the “K Street
Project” period in which the House Republican leadership built close relationships with lobbyists who engaged in major fundraising for the party,187 many
Republican lobbyists lost their jobs in 2006 and 2008 as Democrats took control of the House, Senate, and executive branch and Democratic lobbyists had
greater career opportunities.188 When it became clear in 2010 that Republicans
were poised to retake control of the House, Republican lobbyists again grew in
demand.189
182. See GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 11
(2001) (describing the use of campaign contributions to secure access to elected officials).
183. See Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical
Lobbying, Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 10, 15-17 (2008) (describing experiments in which experimenters created feelings of
reciprocity through the provision of a soft drink); see also Mayer, supra note 13, at 524 (citing means by which interest groups and lobbyists secure access and influence).
184. See KAISER, supra note 23, at 297 (explaining that according to lobbyist Gerry
Cassidy, money is given to “reinforce established connections” and “because of long-term
relationships and friendships”); Larry Makinson, What Money Buys, in SHADES OF GRAY:
PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPAIGN ETHICS 171, 181 (Candice J. Nelson et al. eds., 2002) (discussing relationship building among candidates, lobbyists, and PACs). The ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 97, at 20, refers to “a self-reinforcing cycle of mutual financial dependency.”
185. See Hall & Deardorff, supra note 172, at 80 (“Money buys access only to one’s
allies, and the behavioral consequence is greater legislative effort on behalf of a shared objective, not a disingenuous vote.”).
186. Eric Lichtblau, Anticipating Power Shift, and Hiring Republicans, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2010, at B1.
187. See KAISER, supra note 23, at 4, 272.
188. David Kirkpatrick, For Lobbyists, No Downturn, Just a Turnover, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/washington/
25lobby.html.
189. Lichtblau, supra note 186; Kevin Bogardus & Silla Brush, Democratic Aides May
Get Cold Shoulder from K Street After Midterms, HILL (Sept. 13, 2010, 9:35 PM),
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/118495-democratic-party-aides-see-value-drop-on-k
-street. Lobbyists also target legislators who are key on committees which control policy
areas of interest to their clients. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 174, at 177-78 (de-
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Lobbyists often do much more than simply contribute money themselves to
pivotal legislators; they have become prolific fundraisers and bundlers of campaign contributions for key legislators and party leaders.190 For example, during the 2010 period when Republicans appeared poised to retake control of the
House, House Minority Leader Boehner provided special access to lobbyists
who contributed the maximum $37,800 contribution to various committees
supporting him or who raised at least $100,000 from other contributors.191
Another key means of securing legislative access is for clients to hire former legislators and staffers as lobbyists (through the so-called “revolving
door”). Many prominent former senators and members of Congress have become lobbyists, and dozens of former staffers of sitting senators and members
of Congress have done so as well.192 Indeed, half the senators who left office
between 1998 and 2004 became lobbyists.193 These revolving-door lobbyists
scribing the lobbying role of two former aides to House Ways and Means Chair Dan Rostenkowski in the 1986 tax reform negotiations).
190. See KAISER, supra note 23, at 80 (discussing lobbyist Gerry Cassidy’s role in running a PAC for his client, the Ocean Spray cranberry cooperative, and “help[ing] decide who
got its money”); see also id. at 272 (noting that during the 1990s, “[m]any members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, asked lobbyists to be their finance chairmen”); id. at
291 (“[L]obbyists often told the PACs where to give their money . . . . [L]obbyists had become indispensable to politicians. They served as advisors, fundraisers, even finance chairmen of their campaigns.”); id. at 105-06 (describing how Cassidy and his associates organized a fundraiser to help a member of Congress with key power to block or approve an
earmark request of Cassidy’s client); id. at 185 (discussing how fourteen members of Cassidy’s firm gave contributions to a member of Congress while business was pending before
that congressman’s committee, and how Cassidy’s client flew another congressman and his
wife “to Hawaii for a week for a ‘seminar’ sponsored by [the client]” and paid him a $2000
honorarium for making the trip). Senator Chuck Hagel described how both Democrats and
Republicans looking to raise $20 million to $25 million for House and Senate campaign
committees “go to a committee of twenty-five lobbyists, a steering committee. And you say,
Okay, you guys each have to come up with a million dollars.” Id. at 291.
191. Jonathan Martin, The Cash-for-Speaker Program, POLITICO (July 29, 2010, 4:26
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/40380.html (reporting that Boehner “convened a meeting of top Republican lobbyists . . . to enlist them in the cause” and promised
donors and fundraisers “VIP access to all events, including roundtables, briefings, breakout
discussions and interactive panel discussions”); see also Eric Lipton, G.O.P. Leader Tightly
Bound to Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at A1 (“[Lobbyists and former aides] have
contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to [Boehner’s] campaigns, provided him with
rides on their corporate jets, socialized with him at luxury golf resorts and waterfront bashes
and are now leading fund-raising efforts for his Boehner for Speaker campaign, which is soliciting checks of up to $37,800 each, the maximum allowed. Some of the lobbyists readily
acknowledge routinely seeking his office’s help—calling the congressman and his aides as
often as several times a week—to advance their agenda in Washington. And in many cases,
Mr. Boehner has helped them out.”).
192. The Center for Responsive Politics offers an online database to track this revolving
door. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Revolving Door, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www
.opensecrets.org/revolving (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
193. George Packer, The Empty Chamber: Just How Broken Is the Senate?, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 9, 2010, at 38, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/09/
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have preexisting reciprocal relationships with current legislators and staffers,
which they can then use to gain access for their clients. Though it is no longer
permissible for a former senator to use the Senate gym as a place for lobbying,194 and there is a waiting period for senators after leaving the Senate to engage in certain lobbying activities,195 there is no question that a former senator
or major House staffer who is lobbying for a client is likely to get a phone call
returned and a chance to make the case for the lobbyist’s clients.196 In fact, as
evidence that who you know is more important than what you know, Bertrand
et al. found that revolving-door lobbyists tend to follow their former legislative
bosses from committee to committee, switching from lobbying on an issue such
as health care to one such as defense.197 Expertise is secondary to personal contacts.
A study of health care lobbying before the passage of the Obama health
care law by the Chicago Tribune, Northwestern University, and the Center for
Responsive Politics found:
At least 166 former aides from the nine congressional leadership offices
and five committees involved in shaping health overhaul legislation—along
with at least 13 former lawmakers—registered to represent at least 338 health
care clients since the beginning of last year . . . .
Their health care clients spent $635 million on lobbying over the past two
years . . . .

100809fa_fact_packer; see also Christopher Lee, Daschle Moving to K Street: Dole Played a
Key Role in Recruiting Former Senator, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2005, at A17, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32604-2005Mar13.html (“[Public Citizen
legislative representative Craig] Holman said that in the 1970s only about 3 percent of retiring members of Congress wound up in K Street law and lobbying firms. These days, the figure is more like 32 percent, he said, in part fueled by the dramatic increase in pay for such
positions.”).
194. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, R. XXIII, at 18 (2007) (as
amended by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), Pub. L.
No. 110-81, § 533, 121 Stat. 735, 765-66).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)(1)(A) (Supp. I 2007).
196. See, e.g., Susan Crabtree, PMA’s Fallout Shines Spotlight on Revolving Door of
Lobbyists, HILL (June 22, 2009, 3:29 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/47250-pmas
-fallout-shines-spotlight-on-revolving-door-of-lobbyists (discussing lobbying of Representative John Murtha and others by his former staffers); Manu Raju & John Bresnahan, Sen. Richard Shelby Steers Cash to Ex-Aides, POLITICO (July 29, 2010, 4:25 AM EDT), http://www
.politico.com/news/stories/0710/40388.html (“Since 2008, Alabama Sen. Richard Shelby has
steered more than $250 million in earmarks to beneficiaries whose lobbyists used to work in
his Senate office—including millions for Alabama universities represented by a former top
staffer.”).
197. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An
Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process 18-20 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748024.
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The total of insider lobbyists jumps to 278 when non-health-care firms that
reported lobbying on health issues are added in . . . .198

The article describes how a former congressional staffer who became a lobbyist
for a medical device trade association successfully lobbied to change a $40 billion proposed tax on the industry to a $20 billion tax in the bill, saving his
clients $20 billion.199
Moving from legislator or staffer to lobbyist can be quite lucrative. Former
staffers can expect their salaries to increase significantly,200 and former senators and members of Congress can earn seven-figure salaries.201 One prominent
example is former Congressman Billy Tauzin, who went from his congressional salary to a salary exceeding $2 million per year working for the pharmaceutical industry.202 Vidal et al. find that lobbyists with past work experience in the
office of a United States senator suffer on average a twenty-four percent drop
in revenue when that senator leaves office.203 That is, once the main connection
to the elected official disappears, the revolving-door lobbyist’s value on the
market drops.
3. After the access
Once lobbyists gain access to elected officials, lobbyists solidify relationships of trust and influence by providing credible information (on both policy
and politics) to elected officials and staffers in order to help the legislative office make informed policy choices and succeed in achieving legislative
goals.204 Today is an era of information overload; the best lobbyists recognize

198. Andrew Zajac, Congressional Staffers Turn Lobbyists: Health Care Lobby Drafts
Army of Insiders to Help Fight Overhaul, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 20, 2009), http://articles
.chicagotribune.com/2009-12-20/news/0912190289_1_health-care-lobbyists-insiders.
199. Id.
200. Bogardus & Brush, supra note 189 (“Lobbying salaries offered to Democratic staffers leaving Congress for K Street about a year ago [in 2009] ranged from $250,000 to
$500,000.”); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Premium Placed on Lobbyists Who Served in Congress, FOX NEWS (Mar. 20, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,188563,00.html
(“While rank and file House and Senate members make around $165,000 a year, the average
high-level Washington lobbyist makes at least $300,000 a year, with many former members
making much more than that, according to reports.”). For average staffer salaries, see Daniel
Schuman, What’s the Average Salary of House Staff?, OPEN HOUSE PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.theopenhouseproject.com/2009/12/02/whats-the-average-salary-of-house-staff.
201. Lee, supra note 193; Vlahos, supra note 200.
202. Paul Blumenthal, The Legacy of Billy Tauzin: The White House-PhRMA Deal,
SUNLIGHT FOUND., (Feb. 12, 2010, 12:51 PM), http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2010/
02/12/the-legacy-of-billy-tauzin-the-white-house-phrma-deal.
203. Jordi Blanes i Vidal et al., Revolving Door Lobbyists (July 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641217.
204. GROSSMAN & HELPMAN, supra note 182, at 5-6 (describing the information role
played by lobbyists for special interest groups); see also Kevin M. Esterling, Buying Exper-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1734428

226

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:191

that their long-term reputations depend upon credibility and the usefulness of
the information they provide.205
Access certainly does not guarantee lobbyist success. Indeed, lobbyists often have a difficult time getting elected officials to take action on their proposed policy changes.206 Moreover, it is easier for lobbyists to react to a changing policy environment than to facilitate major legislative change.207 It is more
accurate to think of access as a necessary but insufficient condition for a lobbyist to achieve a client’s goals.208
With the black box of lobbying regulation now pried open, we can turn to
the question of skew: how does lobbying affect public policy?
B. The National Economic Welfare Rationale for Lobbying Regulation
1. Lobbying skew, equality, and inefficiency
The skew question—how lobbying affects public policy—is a key to understanding the national economic welfare rationale for lobbying regulation.
Preliminarily, it is worth noting a problem with measuring skew: one of the
most important ways that lobbyists may skew legislative outcomes is by preserving the status quo when the public or legislators otherwise would prefer
legislative change.209 That is, lobbyists can often achieve their goals by blocking the enactment of new laws or amendment of existing laws. Our federal system for the passage of bills contains multiple points to block legislative action
(“vetogates”).210 Lobbyists often can block change, even change supported by
a majority in Congress or the country, simply by successfully lobbying a committee chair or other legislator or member of the executive branch who controls
a key aspect of the legislative agenda. Thus, skew may be difficult to detect if
lobbyists have acted by preventing change that otherwise would have happened. It is hard to attribute causation in the face of legislative inertia.

tise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 93, 93 (2007).
205. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 124; Hall & Deardorff, supra note
172.
206. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 88 (describing lobbyists’ difficulties
in capturing the attention of legislators).
207. Id. at 110-11.
208. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J.
ECON. PERSP. 105, 126 (2003).
209. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 7 (“The most common single goal
[of lobbyists in the study] is, not surprisingly, to protect the status quo from a proposed
change.”).
210. On “vetogates,” see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 66-68 (4th ed. 2007).
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Political science studies of lobbying do not support the Obama view that
lobbyists’ actions generally “drown out the views of the American people”211
as to issues about which the public has a view and is paying attention. However, as to less salient issues—the vast majority of issues taken up by Congress—
lobbying does appear to skew public policy in certain directions.
First, lobbying skews public policy away from the interests of the poor.212
The reason for this skewing is the logic of collective action213: those with resources and with narrow (as opposed to diffuse) interests in particular legislation can more easily overcome collective action problems and engage in political activity such as hiring lobbyists who have easy access to elected officials
and their staffs. There can be more subtle influence as well. “The cumulative
effects of spending most of one’s spare time in the company of wealthy people
and their particular view of the world, and corresponding expectations among
the wealthy that they have special claims, likewise do little for the quality of
representative democracy.”214 The poor are the least likely to overcome these
problems and organize. Even if they try to organize, the poor face an uphill battle; a status quo bias favors wealthy interests, who have already won in the
past.215
Despite the collective action advantages to narrow groups, such groups do
not win all battles. The student loan bill is the latest high-profile example of a
failed lobbying effort to stop policy that has the support of key policymakers,
including the President, and strong public support. But lobbying can skew public policy over the vast majority of issues about which the public is not paying
attention. As to those issues, lobbying tends to skew public policy toward narrow groups that can overcome collective action problems and pursue their policy goals at the expense of the general public.216

211. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
212. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 255-57 (discussing how neither citi-

zens groups nor organized labor has lobbied much in favor of issues that matter most to low
income Americans, and noting that many citizen groups lobby on issues such as environmental and consumer issues).
213. The classic text is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). See
also SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 169, at 123-24 (discussing the collective action
problem in the formation of interest groups, and the greater ability of narrow interests to
overcome collective action problems); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
214. MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND
DEMOCRACY 71-72 (2005); see also Hall & Deardorff, supra note 172, at 81 (“Groups that
are better able to pay the costs of information-gathering, policy analysis, and lobbying will
be advantaged in addition to whatever advantages they might accrue from better grass roots
organization and more contributions to congressional campaigns.”).
215. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 19-20.
216. This is not a new observation. See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN
PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 30-37 (1960); SCHLOZMAN &
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As the study by Baumgartner et al. shows, citizen groups that engage in
lobbying have fewer resources than business groups and “are often spread
thin.”217
And when [citizen groups] do get involved in, say, an issue relating to consumer credit practices by banks, or an environmental dispute related to coalmining practices, or automobile emissions standards, they often find themselves in a David and Goliath position, with a few staff members on their side
facing sometimes hundreds of industry lobbyists or researchers who work on
nothing but that one particular issue year-in and year-out.218

Citizen groups use resources besides finances, such as mobilizing voters, to attempt to fight business lobbying interests,219 but it is often a losing battle.220
As the authors explain it:
[Lobbyist-led political mobilization is] skewed not just toward the wealthy,
but more generally toward professional communities of corporations, professionals, and institutions and therefore away from average citizens. One need
not adopt a class-based approach to the study of lobbying in the United States
to recognize that K Street is full of well-paid representatives of corporate
America. The airlines are more likely to be present in the lobbying community
than the diffuse group of people who often suffer through terrible service as
airline customers. The bias is not just a corporate one; this is an oversimplification. More accurately, it is a bias toward professions and occupations. Many
Americans may share an opinion, an ideology, or a feeling. But they are dramatically less likely to mobilize and join an interest group with a powerful
Washington presence on the basis of these shared interests than they are to be
a member of a professional association or labor union or be employed by a
company or an institution that has substantial representation in Washington.221

TIERNEY, supra note 169, at 87 (“[T]he number of organizations in the Washington pressure
community is tilted heavily in favor of the advantaged, especially business, at the expense of
the representation of broad publics and the disadvantaged.”).
217. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 11.
218. Id. at 11-12. The authors give this example:
The American Petroleum Institute, for example, has about 270 staff and an annual budget of
$42 million. All these people are not lobbyists, of course, and the budget goes for many
things, to be sure, but the Institute deals only with petroleum issues. When the issue shifts to
nuclear energy, the Nuclear Energy Institute, with 125 staff members and a budget of $34
million, may get involved. Electrical generation in general? The Edison Electric Institute will
be there, with its 200 staff and $50 million annual budget.

Id. at 12; see also NOWNES, supra note 169, at 208-12 (discussing how business firms dominate lobbying in the United States, and considering whether this is a sign of strength or
weakness of business groups).
219. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 169, at 12.
220. On the other hand, “[m]aterial resources can sometimes be trumped by sheer numbers—organizations with many members may be heeded just as rapidly as organizations able
to make large campaign contributions.” Id. at 194.
221. Id. at 28.
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Business groups, thanks to their greater material resources (such as political action committee (PAC) contributions and the lobbyists they can afford to hire),
have another significant advantage when it comes to lobbying:
Businesses are more likely to have a friend in a high place than are other types
of groups. . . . [U]nions and citizen groups are quite successful in working
with the rank and file but rarely get to take advantage of the highest level of
government support. Businesses enjoy much greater access and cooperation at
this level, more than twice the level of the citizen groups.222

a.

Rent-seeking, social inefficiencies, and social costs

Economists have a term for the policy goals often pursued by narrow
groups through their Washington lobbyists: rent-seeking.223 Classic rentseeking “occurs when resources are used in order to capture a monopoly right
instead of being put to a productive use.”224 Broadly speaking, “[r]ent seeking
is the socially costly pursuit of wealth transfers.”225 As will be clear below,
lobbyist inefficiencies result from more than just rent-seeking; we must also
consider the inefficiency of the lobbyist-produced legislation itself.
Tullock explains the core efficiency loss caused by fighting over transfers:
Suppose that ten different lobbyists go to Washington representing ten different associations, and each spends one million dollars over the course of a
couple of years in the hope of influencing Congress to provide them with a
monopoly. Only one of the lobbyists is successful and the monopoly turns out
to have a present discounted value of ten million dollars. There is a substantial
redistribution of resources from the unsuccessful lobbyists to the successful.
This substantial redistribution has occurred simultaneously with a considerable waste of resources in general, both because these highly intelligent
people could otherwise be doing something of higher productivity and because
the economy’s use of resources has been further distorted by the creation of
the monopoly.226

222. Id. at 202; see also id. at 209 (discussing the importance of high-level allies of
lobbyists willing to push for an issue as a correlate to lobbyist success).
223. Gordon Tullock was the first to write about the concept, though the term originates
with Ann O. Krueger. See Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking, in THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 604,
604 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1991).
224. Hasen, supra note 160, at 9; see also Tullock, supra note 223, at 604-09.
225. Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 506, 506
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). A narrower definition of rent-seeking would focus more
closely on government-conferred “barriers to entry, such as restrictive licensing or permit
regimes.” MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 49 (2009).
226. Tullock, supra note 223, at 606. Other scholars have explored the parallel question
of why bribes are so low and campaign contributions and spending so low in a democracy,
given what is at stake. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, Cheap Bribes and the
Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators, 78 PUB. CHOICE 305,
305-06 (1994); see also Ansolabehere et al., supra note 208, at 105.
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Despite the mathematical cleanliness of Tullock’s example, there is no reason to believe that total lobbying costs typically will equal the government benefit sought. Indeed, returns on lobbying tend to be quite high for the winners,
raising the question why lobbying expenditures are not even greater. One promising possibility is that given finite quantities of elected officials’ and staff’s
time, there is a declining marginal utility of lobbying: adding a twentieth industry lobbyist may not do much to further the client’s cause.
The social ill of rent-seeking is that it causes a decline in overall social
wealth (in economic parlance, it is Kaldor-Hicks inefficient227) as resources are
devoted to capturing and keeping government benefits, rather than being put to
productive use. “Assume that A puts in $50 for lobbying to get $100 from B
and B puts in $50 lobbying against that. Regardless of the outcome, one part
[sic] will gain $50 from his lobbying. Society has lost $100.”228
Noneconomists sometimes find this rent-seeking analysis nonintuitive: after all, how is a business’s decision to spend money on lobbying any less efficient than an individual’s decision to spend money on a consumer good, an action which can actually help the economy? Stearns and Zywicki note this
problem in teaching the concept of rent-seeking to law students.229 They ex-

227. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the typical normative measure used in law and economics analysis, focusing on overall social wealth regardless of its distribution. See Hasen, supra
note 160, at 8. In less technical parlance, it is a normative criterion aimed at increasing the
size of the pie, rather than deciding how to divide up pie slices.
228. Tullock, supra note 223, at 606. In an important supplement to Tullock’s analysis
of rent-seeking, Fred McChesney models the lobbyist-elected official behavior as one in
which elected officials extort (or “extract”) payments from lobbyists and interest groups under threat of passing legislation which will hurt the groups’ economic interests. See FRED S.
MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL
EXTORTION (1997) [hereinafter MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING]; see also Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 101, 101-02 (1987) [hereinafter McChesney, Rent Extraction]. Though it is
unclear how much lobbyist-related behavior should be labeled as rent-seeking rather than
part of an elected official’s acts of rent extraction, for my purposes the distinction does not
matter because rent extraction also is Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. Rent extraction creates social
losses in at least three ways. “First, the possibility that government may reduce returns to
their capital unless paid off naturally reduces firms’ incentives to invest in the first place.”
MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING, supra, at 33. Second, “[t]he value of existing capital is
also diminished by the possibility that it will be extracted.” Id. at 34. “Third, one must include in the total social cost of rent extraction the transaction (including bargaining) costs
incurred in the extraction process—just as private blackmail and extortion are undesirable
for similar reasons.” Id. In addition, there are the “costs of operating the legislative process”
and “the deadweight costs of hiding resources so as to avoid their being subject to extraction
in the first place, and the effects of that concealment on bargaining costs.” Id. For an argument for campaign finance limits building on McChesney’s concern about legislator extortion, see David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1380-81 (1994).
229. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO PUBLIC
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 24 (2010) (“Students often have trouble grasp-
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plain that “rent seeking is purely redistributive in nature and thus the real cost
of rent seeking is the diversion of human and other capital away from productive activity (such as lawyers drafting contracts) to purely redistributive activity
(lobbying).”230
This argument against rent-seeking therefore is similar to the efficiency arguments Richard McAdams and I have made justifying laws against theft: inefficiency occurs not because of the transfer itself, but thanks to the indirect costs
of a legalized theft market, such as the defensive measures which individuals
would take to deter theft and the countermeasures taken by thieves to overcome
the defenses, which direct resources away from more productive social uses.231
Similarly, substantial lobbying costs go to defensive measures to protect
against the rent-seeking activity of others and related countermeasures.232
b. Inefficiency beyond rent-seeking
Aside from rent-seeking costs, political economists have noted that the
content of lobbyist-influenced legislation is likely to be inefficient as well.233
Lobbying can cause the government to spend money on duplicative or inefficient programs—think of the “bridge to nowhere”234—and to pass protective
legislation that discourages competition or private innovation. In both situations, the rent-seeking activity distorts the economic market and discourages
economic productivity.235 A bridge to somewhere would have facilitated com-

ing why expenditures on activities like political lobbying are costs to the economy rather
than just a subset of welfare-enhancing mutually beneficial exchange of services.”).
230. Id.
231. See Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case
Against Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 367 (1997).
232. On occasion, lobbying activities to defeat earlier-imposed rent-seeking legislation
could in isolation be efficient. For example, a lobbyist may successfully get the government
to remove a protective tariff. Overall, however, a culture of fighting over transfers is likely to
be inefficient, akin to the usual inefficiencies of arms races. See Charles Anderton, Teaching
Arms-Race Concepts in Intermediate Microeconomics, 21 J. ECON. EDUC. 148, 158-59
(1990).
233. See, e.g., Peltzman, supra note 213; Stigler, supra note 213; see also McChesney,
Rent Extraction, supra note 228 (noting government-produced inefficiencies created by politicians’ desire to extract rents).
234. See Ed Hornick, Stevens’ Senate Career Hurt by “Bridge to Nowhere,” CNN (July
29, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-07-29/politics/stevens.history_1_senate-financial
-disclosure-bridge-democrat-from-west-virginia?_s=PM:POLITICS (“In 2005, legislation
backed by Stevens to build a so-called ‘bridge to nowhere’ became a lightning rod for those
critics. The proposal called for construction of a $223 million bridge to connect Alaska’s
Gravina Island—population 50—to the mainland.”).
235. In this way, the wasted competition between lobbyists over government transfers
costs the economy much more than competition between Coke and Pepsi for each other’s
customers. (Coke reported spending $2.6 billion worldwide in 2006 on advertising-related
expenditures. FAQs—Advertising, COCA-COLA, http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/
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merce. Only reasonable patent protection will spur innovation without discouraging new market entrants and innovation.
Though the government is obviously capable of passing duplicative, inefficient, and protective legislation in the absence of lobbying, lobbying makes the
passage of inefficient legislation much more likely. Rational politicians seeking
to maximize their chances of reelection ordinarily would have an incentive to
avoid waste and duplication, and to create the conditions for economic growth,
but for the rent-seeking lobbying activity.236
Though it is hard to quantify how much rent-seeking legislation costs the
U.S. economy indirectly in the form of distorted government decisions, as explained below there is every reason to believe that the overall effect is likely
great—producing inefficiencies at rates many times the few billion dollars each
year spent directly on lobbying expenditures. Indeed, considering the direct and
indirect costs of rent-seeking legislation together, rent-seeking legislation could
be undermining the health of the overall U.S. economy, threatening the economic position of the United States compared to other world powers. As Mancur Olson has explained, societies with rampant rent-seeking may be at a competitive disadvantage compared to other countries and may eventually decline
as a result.237
Minimizing rent-seeking therefore may be a necessary component of an
effort to improve U.S. economic productivity and decrease the deficit. Unchecked rent-seeking may retard long-term economic growth. In their look
back at the Gilded Age in the United States, Glaeser et al. suggest that an earlier round of regulation to curb rent-seeking was necessary to sustain U.S. economic growth.238 Similarly, a study by Murphy et al. finds that national economic growth is negatively correlated with the number of lawyers in a country
and positively correlated with the number of engineers—suggesting that the national economy benefits from production and suffers from fights over trans-

contactus/faq/advertising.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).) That is, lobbying expenditures
(but not soft-drink advertising expenditures) cause the government to make inefficient decisions that hurt the overall national economy.
236. They may have incentives to seek benefits for their own states or districts, however
(like the “bridge to nowhere”), which can still create inefficiency on a national scale. The
desire to bring “pork” back to each district raises its own version of the collective action
problem for legislators.
237. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); see also STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 225,
at 60-63 (exploring Olson’s insights, and arguing that the radical reform necessary to curb
rent-seeking could be socially destabilizing).
238. See Edward Glaeser et al., The Injustice of Inequality, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 199
(2003). As the authors note, “if political and regulatory institutions can be moved by wealth
or influence, they will favor the established, not the efficient.” Id. at 200.
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fers.239 I have not seen a similar study looking at lobbyists, though I suspect we
would see a similar effect.
c.

The efficiency costs of lobbying

While the earlier example using a $100 lobbying cost is obviously unrealistic, the actual scope of federal lobbying is quite large. Figure 1 shows that lobbying costs have risen steadily each year, from $1.44 billion per year in 1998 to
just under $3.5 billion per year in 2009.
The $3.6 billion-plus annual cost of lobbying may seem large, though it is
relatively small compared to the size of the national economy. The greater economic concern is the inefficient content of lobbying-influenced legislation. The
return on lobbying is often positive but difficult to measure, in part because of
how little data federal law requires lobbyists to disclose. Obviously business
groups, labor unions, citizen groups, local groups, and others must be seeing
some results to be investing billions of dollars in the activity each year.240 One
recent important study has overcome methodological impediments to measuring returns to lobbying. Alexander et al. looked at lobbying for a one-time special tax rule (a tax “holiday” on “repatriated” foreign earnings) passed as part
of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA).241 The authors counted
ninety-three companies that lobbied for the passage of the AJCA (either individually, or as part of a coalition), spending a total of $282.7 million on lobbying,
averaging $3 million per firm.242 The overall repatriated amount for the companies taking advantage of the repatriation holiday was over $298 billion, with
a tax savings of approximately $88 billion, meaning that the overall return rate
on lobbying was over 30,000%.243 Though there certainly were free riders who
did not lobby but took advantage of the repatriation holiday, returns were higher for coalition participants.244 Examining a more limited sample of companies
that apparently spent more than $1 million each lobbying for the AJCA, the return was about $243 for each dollar spent lobbying.245
FIGURE 1

239. See Kevin M. Murphy et al., The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,
106 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1991).
240. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 208, at 126 (contrasting the relatively low
amounts spent on campaign contributions with the larger amounts spent on lobbying).
241. See Raquel Alexander et al., Measuring Rates of Return on Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 25 J.L. &
POL. 401 (2009).
242. Id. at 404. General Electric (GE) spent the most on lobbying as an individual company, $24.7 million. Id. at 426.
243. Id. at 427.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 429.
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Federal Lobbying Spending over Time246

Another new study connects lobbying by financial institutions to the financial crisis. Igan et al. found that lobbying by financial institutions such as Ameriquest “was associated with more risk taking during 2000-07 and worse outcomes in 2008.”247 “In particular, lenders lobbying more intensively on issues
related to mortgage lending and securitization (i) originated mortgages with
higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of
their loans, and (iii) had faster growing loan portfolios.”248 In addition, they
faced higher delinquency rates on their loans in 2008 and experienced negative
abnormal stock returns during key events in the financial crisis.249 They
seemed to benefit more than nonlobbying lenders from the government bailout
of financial institutions.250 The study lends further support for the idea that
rent-seeking activity can have a significantly negative economic effect on the
U.S. economy.251 It is no surprise that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s report credited an “army of lobbyists” for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
ability to resist reform despite signs of serious financial problems.252

246. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www
.opensecrets.org/lobby (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
247. Deniz Igan et al., A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis 1 (Apr.
16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/
default/files/mishra.pdf.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. The authors of the study hedge on whether the results of their study show industry
rent-seeking or whether lenders were simply specialized in certain risks and overoptimistic
in their assessment of their performance. See id. at 27-28.
252. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 38 (
2011) (discussing the “whole army of lobbyists” for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), availa-
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2. The promotion of national economic welfare as a sufficiently
important government interest to be balanced against First
Amendment interests
Though critics of lobbying typically mention corruption or inequality concerns,253 efficiency issues crop up too. Eskridge ties the rise in citizen concern
about lobbying in the nineteenth century to the growth of the federal government: “Citizens concerned with lobbying abuses became increasingly vocal,
and increasingly well-organized, in the last third of the 19th century. During
that period, federal government expenditures increased substantially, stimulating ferocious competition for government largesse as well as heightened public
concern about the means of political competition.”254
Efficiency concerns have been voiced ever since. Then-Senator (and later
Supreme Court Justice) Hugo Black declared in 1935 that “our Government has
lost hundreds of millions of dollars which it should not have lost and which it
would not have lost if there had been proper publicity given to the activities of
lobbyists.”255 Richard Painter, a professor and former ethics counsel for President Bush, reviewed the beginning of the Obama Administration’s approach to
ethics and lobbying issues and identified the rent-seeking problem as intractable given the tremendous size of the federal government and budget: “Neither
this President nor any other can avoid the fact that the more money flows
through government, the larger will be the already sizeable industry that seeks
to direct that money to particular ends.”256 Popular disapproval of the “earmarking” process—whereby federal bills direct sums of money to particular
institutions for particular purposes—is further evidence of popular concern
about the inefficiencies of government facilitated by lobbying.257

ble at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; see also Claire Hill &
Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Government and Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1684-87 (2011) (discussing Fannie and Freddie campaign contributions to lawmakers).
253. See Krishnakumar, supra note 59, at 522 (“The public perceives two main categories of problems with the lobbying process: quid pro quos and unequal access.”).
254. Eskridge, supra note 12, at 6 (emphasis added).
255. Registration and Regulation of Lobbyists: Hearing on S. 2512 Before a Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong. 12 (1935) (statement of Sen. Black).
256. Painter, supra note 85, at 206.
257. The size of earmarks is quite small relative to the federal budget, and therefore the
public’s focus on eliminating earmarks in order to significantly decrease government rentseeking may be misplaced. See Walter Alarkon, Self-Imposed Republican Moratorium Leads
to Drop in 2011 Earmark Spending, HILL ON MONEY (Aug. 1, 2010, 3:18 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/appropriations/112059-gop-moratorium-leads-to-drop
-in-2011-earmark-spending; Jeanne Sahadi, Earmarks: Myth and Reality, CNNMONEY (Mar.
11, 2009, 11:54 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/11/news/economy/earmark_primer/
index.htm.
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These statements recognize the public’s strong interest in limiting government inefficiencies. Especially at a time of record budget deficits and financial
instability, promoting national economic welfare may be a rare government interest that could attract support from both the left and the right. The concern
here is more than simply keeping costs (or taxes) down; as the works of Olson
and others show, the question could be one of the national economic security of
the United States.
Despite longstanding public and scholarly concern about rent-seeking, I am
aware of no court that has ever considered whether national economic welfare
could be considered a sufficiently important (even compelling) government interest that could justify lobbying (or other) laws. The term “rent-seeking” has
appeared only twice in Supreme Court opinions. First, Justice Breyer, dissenting from dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari in a patent case, quoted
from a book by Landes and Posner discussing the rent-seeking potential of a
rule that would allow for the patentability of basic scientific and technological
principles.258 Second, as discussed in Part III.B.1 below, Justice Stevens in his
dissent in Citizens United mentioned the potential for rent-seeking by corporations as part of his discussion of the antidistortion rationale for corporate spending limits in candidate campaigns.259
Legal scholars too have been well aware of rent-seeking, though no one
has focused on the role of lobbying regulation in curbing the practice. Jonathan
Macey, for example, famously called upon courts to construe ambiguous statutes in a public-regarding way, rather than to enforce private rent-seeking
deals.260 Farber and Frickey were skeptical of Macey’s approach that would
have courts strike down rent-seeking laws that conflict with public values because of the difficulty of determining what counts as rent-seeking.261 Lobbying
for the AJCA is a good example, where lobbyists promoted the legislation as a
job creation measure.262 Courts would have to determine whether these claims
were pretextual. Farber and Frickey also wondered whether courts could pick
out and strike down special interest provisions in laws that otherwise promote
public values.263

258. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003)).
259. See infra Part III.B.1.
260. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
261. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 69-70 (1991).
262. In fact, the law failed to create a large number of jobs. See Alexander et al., supra
note 241, at 419 n.88.
263. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 261, at 70.
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Farber and Frickey instead advocated a different proceduralist solution to
the problem of rent-seeking: judicial remands to Congress when the Supreme
Court is convinced that there has been insufficient deliberation over legislation.264 Only Robert Sitkoff (later picked up by Justice Stevens) has tied rentseeking to a substantive law change; Sitkoff argued that corporations may be
especially adept at engaging in rent-seeking, and accordingly, limitations on
corporate contributions and expenditures might be justified.265 But no one has
offered a detailed defense of the broader national economic welfare rationale,
or applied it to lobbying regulation.
C. Balancing the State’s Interest in Promoting National Economic
Welfare with First Amendment Speech and Petition Rights in the
Lobbying Context
Determining that the state has an interest in promoting national economic
welfare begins, but does not end, the constitutional analysis. On the other side
of the scales are the First Amendment speech, association, and petition rights,
which protect lobbying activities. As Eskridge puts it: “One of the goals of the
right to petition is to encourage and foster a ‘pressure’ system of politics, in
which interest groups are expected to influence representatives through a wide
array of techniques, with very few out-of-bounds, in a continuing game of
struggle and domination.”266 The question is how to achieve the right constitutional balance.
We can start with some easy cases. Congress seems to have ample power
to prevent legislator and staff receipt of gifts from lobbyists. Though a gift ban
is justified on anticorruption grounds, it is also justifiable on efficiency
grounds. Voters are principals who elect legislators as agents to pursue the public interest and guard against economic inefficiencies in government. Gifts can
cause legislators and staffers to be more willing to give in to lobbyist recommendations for legislative action (or inaction), and lobbyists will often recommend socially inefficient legislative actions. By banning lobbyists’ gifts, legislators (and staffers) are more likely to pursue legislation in the public
interest.267

264. Id. at 118-31 (discussing due process of lawmaking). They also suggest (in their
book predating Citizens United) that Congress limit contributions and expenditures from
business and labor political action committees. Id. at 132-34.
265. Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1112-13, 1124-25 (2002).
266. Eskridge, supra note 12, at 5.
267. Another easy constitutional case is a ban on contingent-fee lobbying. Contingentfee lobbying may result in an increase in costs to the taxpayer, as the lobbyist inflates the
amount requested in an earmark to cover the expected commission. Susman & Martin, supra
note 95, at 670.
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At the other end of the spectrum of constitutionality are laws that would
actually ban lobbying. The Supreme Court in Citizens United recently remarked in dicta that laws banning lobbying would be unconstitutional,268 and
the matter seems scarcely in doubt. A somewhat more difficult question is
whether Congress could condition a private entity’s entry into government contracts on forfeiting the right to lobby, as suggested by Senator Paul.269 At first
glance, this appears to be an unconstitutional condition, though some of the tax
cases might lend support for such a tradeoff.270 Such a lobbying ban would
likely encompass most major U.S. and foreign companies, and it seems unlikely to pass muster before the current Supreme Court. Senator Paul’s proposal
also would give a lobbying advantage to those corporations without government contracts (who could well lobby for government contracts and then be
bought by existing corporations after contracting) and encourage lobbying
through trade associations rather than the contracting companies themselves.
More interesting are constitutional questions about lobbying regulations
that are less severe than bans but would break the strong bond of reciprocity
encouraging legislators and staffers to grant lobbyists special access and favors.
The best way to limit reciprocity is to follow the recommendation made by the
ABA Task Force and others to take lobbyists (and those who retain and direct
lobbyists) out of the business of fundraising for candidates.271 Lobbyists still
could make smaller, individual personal donations, but they would not be allowed to solicit clients, coworkers, or associates to make contributions to candidates, parties, or committees, and they could not engage in any bundling activities.
This impetus to break the reciprocity relationship may have been behind
the 2007 bundling disclosure provisions of HLOGA. As Representative Van
Hollen explained, “[W]hen the bundling of contributions is done by someone
who lobbies on behalf of a particular interest, this practice enables the lobbyist
to enhance his or her stature with an official. This enhancement increases their
opportunity to advance the cause of a special interest.”272 Unfortunately, lobbyist bundling disclosure might have had the perverse effect of increasing the
stature of the lobbyist with an elected official, by documenting how hard a lobbyist is working for an elected official or her party.273 It is only a ban on such

268. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
269. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
270. Cf. Theodore P. Seto, Keeping Tax-Subsidized Corporate Money out of Politics,

127 TAX NOTES 1476, 1477 (2010).
271. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 97, at vii.
272. 153 CONG. REC. H9209 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Van Hollen).
273. This appears to be the role of voluntary bundling disclosure in presidential elections. See Richard L. Hasen, The Transformation of the Campaign Finance Regime for U.S.
Presidential Elections 17 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1505527 (discussing donor motivations for bundling).
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fundraising activities that can help break the cycle of special access and favors.274
The other way to break the reciprocity relationship is to impose longer revolving-door restrictions on elected officials and staffers. For example, a fiveyear anti-revolving-door provision on compensated lobbying would make it
harder for former elected officials and staffers to be able to use personal connections. Ex-officials and staffers five years out will be less in demand as lobbyists, because they will be less valuable to clients as points of access. They
would also minimize the major principal-agent problems arising as staffers or
legislators reach the end of their government careers, when they might take particular official actions to support future lobbyist employers or clients in an effort to secure postgovernment service employment.
Limiting fundraising and contributions, and a lengthened transition from
government to lobbying, would not end the practice of lobbying or otherwise
limit the ability of lobbyists to communicate with elected officials and staffers.
But these steps could affect the nature of how lobbying would work by decreasing the number of favors done that are not preferred by either voters or legislators. “As money becomes less influential, the value of information will increase.”275 In other words, if we could break the monetary connection between
lobbyists and elected officials, lobbyists’ primary role would be an information
function, and competition among lobbyists would help to ensure that elected
officials and staffers received accurate and helpful information.276 The information-driven market would lead toward greater government efficiencies and
less rent-seeking.
Importantly, reforms would not require us to figure out which lobbying activities count as rent-seeking, a key critique Farber and Frickey raised to other
proposals aimed at rent-seeking.277 By breaking the ties between money or personal connections and legislative outcomes, lobbying reform aims at a meritbased system in which the most useful information rises to the top.
The constitutional question raised by such laws would require courts to
balance the efficiency benefits of these laws with lobbyists’ First Amendment
rights. The Green Party and Brinkman cases hold that solicitation provisions
and revolving-door statutes should be subject to strict scrutiny, because they are
bans on political speech.278 Contribution bans are subject to lower scrutiny, but
still must survive a close look from the courts. Both Green Party and Brinkman
274. See Ainsworth, supra note 171, at 6-7 (arguing that controlling access is one
means of checking the influence of lobbyists).
275. Susman, supra note 183, at 18.
276. See Nick Allard, We Need More Lobbyists, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 2010, at 13,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/11/we-need-more-lobbyists.html.
277. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 261, at 69-70; see also supra text accompanying note 261.
278. See supra Part I.B.2.
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held that the anticorruption interest could not justify the particular laws at issue
in those cases. But those cases did not consider the national economic welfare
interest, and both courts indicated that more narrowly tailored lobbying laws
might pass constitutional muster.279
Antibundling provisions, contribution limitations, and longer antirevolving-door provisions are much less draconian than some of the Obama
Administration rules, which limit actual communications from lobbyists and
bar lobbyists from serving in the administration (a reverse revolving door). In
addition, it is not clear how these rules would promote economic efficiency.
For example, the rule barring oral communications about certain government
contracts connected with the economic stimulus plan (which was eventually extended beyond lobbyists to everyone communicating with the administration)
would seemingly bar the provision of private strategic advice which could be
useful to an elected official without a likely reduction in rent-seeking.
The rule barring registered lobbyists from serving on advisory commissions seems to limit the information available in groups whose very goal is to
bring together people of diverse interests to advise the government.280 Participation on these advisory commissions is not tantamount to giving an individual
lobbyist access to legislative or executive branch officials. Similarly, the reverse revolving-door rule (barring lobbyists coming into the government) has
the social cost of excluding a class of public interest lobbyists who are potentially less likely to be involved in rent-seeking activity.281
The administration defended the latter rule on grounds that it did not want
to be seen as favoring its friends in determining which lobbyists could work for
the administration.282 But the administration already imposed a rule barring

279. In Brinkman, the anti-revolving-door law applied to uncompensated lobbying as
well. I agree with the Brinkman court that a ban on uncompensated lobbying is harder to justify, though it may be difficult in practice to know when lobbying is truly uncompensated. In
any case, my proposal considers only compensated lobbying.
280. See Letter from William V. Luneburg, Chair, Section of Admin. Law and Regulatory Practice, ABA, to Norman Eisen, Special Counsel for Ethics and Gov’t Reform, White
House (Mar. 9, 2010), available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/
2011/10/Letter-to-Norman-Eisen-on-FACA-March-9.pdf (criticizing these rules).
281. See Peter Baker, Groups to Push for Exceptions to Lobby Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2009, at A1; Jacob Weisberg, A Tale of Two Lobbyists: What’s Wrong with Obama’s
Order Barring Lobbyists from His Administration?, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2009, 7:24 AM), http://
www.slate.com/id/2216433.
282. See Daniel Newhauser, Obama’s Ethics Counsel Faces Tough Crowd at ABA Conference, BLT: BLOG LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 23, 2009, 10:11 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/
blt/2009/10/obamas-ethics-counsel-faces-tough-crowd-at-aba-conference.html
(“Thomas
Susman . . . questioned Eisen as to why, if indeed these regulations are intended for the public interest, no distinction is made between corporate lobbyists and those who lobby for public interest causes. Eisen responded by saying that the administration did consider parsing
types of lobbying, but in the end, ‘felt that as a matter of principle, we needed to be consistent in that regulation to have credibility.’”); see also Kevin Bogardus, Eisen Lays Out Case
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former administration employees from lobbying the administration for the remainder of the Obama presidency. It is not clear how the rule would do any
more to promote efficiency. Instead, it seems to be more about the appearance
of not being influenced by (former) lobbyists than anything else.
In sum, in close cases courts would have to engage in delicate balancing to
determine whether the government’s interest in promoting national economic
welfare justifies various lobbying regulations when weighed against First
Amendment costs.
III. OBJECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS
A. Objections
1. Ends-based objections
Challengers to lobbying restrictions may argue that the government’s interest in promoting national economic welfare is not sufficiently compelling or is
outweighed by the First Amendment costs of restrictions on political activity.
This objection raises the vexing question of how to determine when a governmental end is important enough, and in some circumstances “compelling,” so
that a challenged regulation can survive judicial scrutiny.
Compelling interests are judicially created and usually not based in the text
of the Constitution.283 Whether a government interest should be recognized as
“compelling” is inevitably a value judgment determined by a court.284 In fact,
the Supreme Court routinely accepts governmental interests, such as preventing
fraud,285 without either explaining the derivation of the compelling interest or
why the interest is compelling.286 Critics have charged that the Court simply

for Limiting Lobbyists’ Role, HILL (Oct. 23, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a
-lobbying/64423-eisen-lays-out-case-for-lobbying-limits.
283. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 919 (1988) (“[A]t no
point does the Constitution mandate or define compelling interests, or establish their weight
or supremacy.”). The national economic welfare rationale arguably does have a textual basis
in the Constitution, in its preamble providing for the establishment of the Constitution to
promote the “general Welfare,” U.S. CONST. pmbl., and in Congress’s power to “provide for
the . . . general Welfare,” id. art. I, § 8, cl.1. However, the Supreme Court has not recognized
these clauses as giving any independent power to Congress to enact legislation. See Gottlieb,
supra, at 960-61.
284. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Scholarship in the 1990s, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 1105, 1114-15 (1994) (book review).
285. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972) (“[T]he prevention of . . . fraud
is a legitimate and compelling government goal.”).
286. See Gottlieb, supra note 283, at 932-38 (canvassing the Supreme Court’s discussion of compelling interests).
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knows a compelling interest when it sees one,287 and David Strauss’s canvass
of compelling interests accepted by the Supreme Court seems to bear out that
criticism,288 given Court recognition of compelling interests ranging from
“maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing the demanding tasks that
judges must perform,” to “protecting . . . citizens from abusive practices in the
solicitation of funds,” to avoiding the appearance of a “corrupt arrangement,”
to “preventing fraud by an applicant for medical care.”289
The government’s interest in promoting national economic welfare seems
to be at least as strong as these other government interests. Especially if we
give credence to Olson’s concerns about the international competitive disadvantage of countries with high amounts of rent-seeking, the national economic
welfare interest seems to be a variant of the government’s indisputably compelling interest in maintaining our national security.290 The national economic
welfare rationale is much more than simply an interest in “administrative convenience,” which the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected as insufficient to
justify serious infringements on constitutional rights.291 Administrative convenience is primarily about saving the government (or taxpayers) from relatively minor expenses;292 national economic welfare is about limiting large-scale
inefficient activity threatening the country’s financial health.
Recognizing the strength of the government’s interest in promoting economic efficiency would not guarantee the constitutionality of certain lobbying
regulations. There is also the question of balancing and fit. Despite (what I
view as) the compelling governmental interest in promoting national economic
welfare, the interest likely would not justify draconian regulations, such as a
ban on lobbying activities. Such a ban would be analogous to a ban on campaign spending, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly held unconstitutional.
The difficult question is whether less severe but still significant lobbying
regulations, such as antisolicitation provisions, lower contribution limits for
lobbyists, and longer anti-revolving-door rules, could survive judicial scrutiny,

287. Id. at 937.
288. See David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT.

REV. 1, 29 n.78.
289. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 248 (1982); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58 (1982); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 268 (1974)).
290. Cf. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“This Court has recognized the Government’s ‘compelling interest’ in withholding national security information
from unauthorized persons in the course of executive business.”).
291. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
292. It also may serve an information-forcing function, for example, by weeding out
government claimants with weak claims who fail to file a form or pay a fee.
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especially if a court determines that strict scrutiny should apply to such laws.293
Courts applying strict scrutiny might accept the constitutionality of strong lobbying regulations in principle, while holding that the laws need to be more narrowly tailored, such as through higher contribution limits, shorter revolvingdoor rules, or more limited antisolicitation rules targeted at particular types of
solicitations, such as solicitations of business associates but not family members.
The more compelling the courts view the national economic welfare rationale to be, the more likely they are to give the government leeway in crafting
lobbying regulations. Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently applied a lower
“exacting scrutiny” standard in reviewing campaign contribution limitations,
and has accepted the government’s compelling interest in such regulations, to
prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, even though many contributions above the contribution limits have very little corruption potential.294
The reason is the government’s exceedingly strong interest in deterring corruption of public officials and preserving public confidence in the democratic
process. Similarly, even though not all lobbying regulation would promote national economic welfare, the Court could accept lobbying regulations that
would tend to minimize inefficiencies.
In other contexts, too, the Supreme Court has rejected First Amendment
challenges to laws aimed at promoting efficient government and protecting the
public from economic loss. Most importantly, in the Hatch Act cases, the Court
upheld severe limits on government employees exercising most of their political rights, such as working for political campaigns in their spare time. In United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, the Court concluded that the Hatch Act was justified by Congress’s “desire to limit party activity of federal employees so as to
avoid a tendency toward a one-party system. It may have considered that parties would be more truly devoted to the public welfare if public servants were
not overactive politically.”295 Further, it was enough that Congress thought
employee political activities would “interfere with the efficiency of the public
service.”296 As the Court reiterated in a follow-up case, U.S. Civil Service
Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, Congress was within its power to conclude that partisan political activities of government employees “must
be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly.”297

293. As discussed in Part II.C, in Green Party and Brinkman the courts judged the antirevolving-door and solicitation provisions under strict scrutiny, but the ban on lobbyist contributions under a lower level of scrutiny. Other courts may disagree with the proper level of
scrutiny.
294. See Hasen, supra note 134, at 586.
295. 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
296. Id. at 101.
297. 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.8.3, at 1116 (3d ed. 2006) (calling the constitutional issue
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Similarly, in the commercial speech context, the Supreme Court has recognized that, despite disagreements about other aspects of the commercial speech
doctrine, the government has a strong interest in protecting consumers by barring false or misleading advertising despite First Amendment objections to regulation.298 These examples demonstrate the Court’s recognition of reasonable
limitations on First Amendment rights when the government has offered an important interest and reasonable means to attain it.
Finally, there is the question of how much evidence would be necessary to
convince the Supreme Court that reasonable lobbying regulations actually can
promote (or be narrowly tailored to the promotion of) national economic welfare. While the evidence I have offered in this Article might not satisfy some
social scientists as to the scope of inefficiencies caused by lobbying, the Court
has accepted much less evidence to justify laws in similar contexts, such as
when the Court recognized the constitutionality of campaign contribution limits
based on virtually no evidence that such limits prevent the “appearance of corruption” and a decline in public confidence in the democratic process.299 There
is a much stronger efficiency case here to justify some lobbying regulations.
2. Means-based objections
Many conservatives agree that rent-seeking is a major problem facing the
United States today, and it is at least partially responsible for the tremendous
size of the federal government. However, these conservatives are skeptical that
any attempt to regulate political activity would be effective in curbing rentseeking. Instead, the only solution they see is to shrink the size of government.
Thus, McChesney remarks that “[t]he one unambiguous solution for reducing

“enormously difficult” given First Amendment costs to government speech, but acknowledging practical experience with patronage practices which “risks distorting the political
process, impairing efficient government operations, and undermining the freedoms of government workers”).
298. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity.” (citations omitted)). In contrast, “[i]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more
circumscribed.” Id. at 564; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 297, § 11.3.7.5, at 1095 (“It
also is clearly established that false and deceptive advertisements are unprotected by the
First Amendment.”). But sometimes the rub is figuring out whether speech is “false” or
“misleading.” See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity
and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 227-28
(2007).
299. See Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and “The Thing That
Wouldn’t Leave,” 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 484 (2000).
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rent extraction is reducing the size of the state itself and its power to threaten,
expropriate, and transfer.”300 Senator Paul is even more emphatic:
While it is important to cut down on the demand for lobbyists, the supply side
is even more important. Washington, D.C. has a supply of money and power
that it can dole out to the highest bidder. As long as this golden goose exists,
people will find ways to take advantage of it. The problem is not the abuse of
power, but rather the power to abuse.
The only answer to that problem is for Congress to reduce severely the size
and scope of the federal government, so that the market is allowed to operate
according to the free forces of a laissez-faire economy.301

The solution to shrink the size of government seems a quixotic one. In the
first place, the very forces that make lobbying so powerful make it exceedingly
difficult to enact major spending cuts. Even more importantly, even if the United States budget were cut in half, the annual federal budget would still be almost $2 trillion.302 There is plenty of room for rent-seeking in such an enormous budget.
Consider one example, from national defense, of rent-seeking activity over
a single engine to a single plane which would still occur in a shrunken government. National defense is an appropriate example because many conservatives
recognize it as a public good which must be supplied even by a smaller government. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a military plane slated to replace a
host of aging military jets currently in use.303 The Pentagon plans to purchase
over 2400 of the Lockheed Martin fighters, at a cost of about $382 billion.304
The main engine for the F-35 is manufactured by Pratt & Whitney, while an
alternative is being jointly developed by General Electric (GE) and RollsRoyce.305
Since the 1990s the military has planned to develop two engines for the F35 and to hold yearly competitions between the two manufacturers. In 2006,
however, the Pentagon announced that it no longer believed the alternative en-

300. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING, supra note 228, at 170. McChesney is pessimistic about regulation. “Attempts to make that world a better place by imposing this or that
constraint on the system, to mitigate or end only one aspect of the problem, can only exacerbate some other problem.” Id.
301. Paul, supra note 7, at 35.
302. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 2009
FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, at xiii (2009), available at http://www.gao
.gov/financial/fy2009/09guide.pdf (reporting the 2009 budget to be more than $3.7 trillion).
303. Matthew Potter, Some Rough Sledding Ahead for JSF Program, DEF.
PROCUREMENT NEWS (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.defenseprocurementnews.com/2010/
09/17/some-rough-sledding-ahead-for-jsf-program.
304. Nathan Hodge, Lockheed Braces for Cost Cuts at the Pentagon,
ST.
J.
(June
17,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
WALL
SB10001424052748703650604575313053091066716.html.
305. Potter, supra note 303.
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gine was necessary, setting the stage for the current fight.306 President Obama
and Defense Secretary Gates oppose an alternative engine, with Gates saying
that it would be a “serious mistake.”307 In 2009, the Senate voted to remove
fiscal year 2010’s funding for the engine, but the House version including funding prevailed.308 The House again inserted funding for the alternative engine in
the 2011 budget, while a Senate panel again recommended against funding.309
Competition between the two manufacturers, proponents argue, will force
suppliers to lower prices, thereby saving taxpayers an estimated $20 billion.
Opponents, including Obama and Gates, argue that the additional cost to develop the alternative—potentially $450 million in fiscal year 2011 alone, and $4.2
billion overall—is wasteful and better spent elsewhere. The total cost of the engine is expected to reach $100 billion.
The lobbying on both sides has been fierce. “[T]here are 75 lobbyists
working on defense issues at the firms engaged in the second engine showdown, of whom at least 56—or 75 percent—are former congressional staffers
or executive branch officials. Of those, at least 33 are registered to work on the
engine issue specifically.”310 Rolls-Royce’s lobbying efforts did not begin in
earnest until 2007.311 In 2006, the company spent only $40,000 on lobbying. In
2007, that figure skyrocketed to $826,000, and to over $1.3 million in 2008 and
2009. Rolls-Royce has two principal in-house lobbyists: Anne McInerney, a
former aide to Senator Jon Kyl and the Senate Appropriations Committee, and
former Congressman Ed Pease. In the 2006, 2008, and 2010 election cycles,
McInerney and Pease contributed $6300 and $9300, respectively, to political
candidates and PACs. Since 2007, the company has used the Livingston Group
and Robison International as principal outside lobbying firms, paying each
$60,000 in 2010. At Livingston, former Congressman Bob Livingston, his for-

306. Megan Scully, New Analysis Fuels Debate over Alternative F-35 Engine,
GOVEXEC.COM (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0210/022610cdam2.htm.
307. John Reed, Gates: Funding F136 Would Be “Serious Mistake,” DEF. NEWS (June
16, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4672964.
308. Craig Whitlock & Dana Hedgpeth, Congress Pursues F-35 Engine That Defense
Secretary Robert Gates Doesn’t Want, WASH. POST (May 28, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052705614
.html.
309. Reed, supra note 307. The latest congressional deal kept the engine funded
through at least March 2011. Jonathan Riskind, Engine Issue Joins Brown, Boehner,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 2, 2011, 6:08 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
editorials/2011/01/02/engine-issue-joins-brown-boehner.html.
310. Nick Schwellenbach, Lobbyists Stage Capitol Hill Dogfight over Joint Strike Fighter Engine, IWATCH NEWS (June 7, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2010/06/
07/2661/lobbyists-stage-capitol-hill-dogfight-over-joint-strike-fighter-engine; see also Whitlock & Hedgpeth, supra note 308.
311. The figures in the next few paragraphs come from searches performed by a research assistant on the Center for Responsive Politics website in September 2010. The lobbying database can be accessed at Ctr. for Responsive Politics, supra note 246.
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mer chief of staff, and another lobbyist working on this issue have given political contributions in the amounts of $42,100, $32,400, and $2000, respectively,
since 2006. In the same period at Robison, the four lobbyists working on RollsRoyce’s business (including a former aide to Senator James Inhofe and the
former Comptroller of the U.S. Marine Corps) have made political donations of
$5000, $11,750, $2000, and $129,900.
Because of the size of GE’s lobbying operation, it is difficult to discern
specific figures for the amounts spent on the F-35 issue. In 2007, GE spent over
$17 million on lobbying, reaching $25.5 million in 2009. GE’s in-house and
external lobbyists count among their ranks former Senators Trent Lott, John
Breaux, and Don Nickles; former House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt; and
Thurgood Marshall, Jr. Since the 2006 cycle, Breaux has given $162,000 in direct contributions, Gephardt has given $161,000, and Marshall has given
$32,000.
Pratt & Whitney is a subsidiary of United Technologies (UT). Data on lobbying expenses for the subsidiary is unavailable. United Technologies, however, spends considerable amounts on lobbying. In 2009, for example, UT spent
$8.1 million on lobbying. UT’s lobbyists include Tony Podesta of the Podesta
Group, Park Strategies principal and former Senator D’Amato, and Cindy Jimenez, a former aide to Speaker Pelosi. Podesta’s direct contributions since the
2006 cycle top $300,000.
This single example of lobbying over the F-35 engine demonstrates not only the stakes, but also the difficulty of using a “shrink the size of the state” solution to the problem of rent-seeking. Lobbying regulation seems more likely to
minimize rent-seeking than calls to shrink the federal government.

FIGURE 2
Number of Federally Registered Lobbyists312

312. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, supra note 246.
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Though shrinking the government cannot be a full answer to ending rentseeking, there are also reasons to question whether lobbying regulation can
make a serious dent in rent-seeking. The question is whether lobbyists will find
ways to gain extra access to elected officials and staffers even with new rules
put in place. Recent experience demonstrates the validity of this “hydraulic”
critique.313 Once the Obama Administration started releasing logs disclosing all
White House visitors, White House officials began taking some meetings with
lobbyists and others at the Caribou Coffee across the street from the White
House.314 The meetings continued; only the venue changed. Similarly, despite
the huge growth in the amount of lobbying,315 the number of lobbyists has not
increased,316 suggesting either that existing lobbyists are doing more work, or
that nonregistered lobbyists are doing the work of lobbyists. The latter possibility appears to be a big part of the story. The Obama Administration’s lobbying
restrictions have led to a “demand for formal methods of de-registering as a
lobbyist.”317 Lobbyists were deregistering in record numbers in 2008 after
HLOGA took effect, and more deregistered in 2009, perhaps in part because of
the new Obama Administration rules.318
FIGURE 3
Number of Lobbyist Deregistrations319

313. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“Money, like water, will always
find an outlet.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999).
314. Eric Lichtblau, Across Street from the White House, Coffee and a Chat with Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at A18.
315. See supra Figure 1.
316. See supra Figure 2.
317. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 85, at 45.
318. CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, THE DEREGISTRATION DILEMMA: ARE LOBBYISTS
QUITTING THE BUSINESS AS FEDERAL DISCLOSURE RULES TIGHTEN? 4-5 (2010), available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/Deregistrationreport.pdf; see also infra Figure 3.
319. CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 318, at 5.
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In addition, many former elected officials took steps to ensure that their activities did not trigger lobbying registrations, such as by devoting less than
twenty percent of their time to lobbying activities as defined by federal statutes.
One prominent example is former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle. He is
not a registered lobbyist, but instead is a “high-paid policy advisor.”320 “Although he never registered, Daschle, in fact, made millions of dollars after he
left government doing stuff that looks, smells and tastes a lot like lobbying
. . . .”321 Daschle and other “nonfederal registered lobbyists[] have had easy
access to the White House in the first two years of the Obama administration,
as shown on the White House log of visitors.”322
The current experience with hydraulics has led to calls (some from lobbyists, who don’t like the competition) to change the lobbying rules to capture
strategists and others who provide lobbying support.323 The lesson for anyone
who would implement the national economic welfare lobbying regulations that
I propose in this Article is to draft the regulations with care so as to minimize
the potential for evasion. As with campaign finance regulation, a kind of
whack-a-mole dynamic could emerge, raising the possibility that effective lobbying regulation will require periodic adjustment to deal with attempts to circumvent the rules.
B. Extensions
1. Reenacting, or partially reenacting, corporate spending limits
In Part II, I argued that the government’s interest in promoting national
economic welfare could justify a number of lobbying regulations. Here, I consider whether that government interest could justify other, related laws. I leave
to others the expansion of the rationale to different areas of the law, such as affirmative action programs or other laws which have run into constitutional controversy.

320. Michael Scherer, Daschle’s Problems: When Is a Lobbyist Not a Lobbyist?, TIME
(Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1876550,00.html (internal
quotation marks omitted).
321. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 193 (“[Daschle] and his new employer say they don’t
expect him to do much traditional lobbying anyway. ‘It will be more meeting with clients
and providing broad strategic advice as to how to deal with matters both domestically here in
Washington as well as internationally,’ said Frank M. Conner, the partner in charge of Alston & Bird’s Washington office.”).
322. Thurber, supra note 86, at 364.
323. See Bara Vaida, K Street Paradox, NAT’L J., Mar. 13, 2010, at 22, 29 (inset interview with Norm Eisen).
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In his Citizens United dissent, Justice Stevens referred to the rentseeking activities of corporations in arguing in favor of the antidistortion rationale for corporate spending limits:
When large numbers of citizens have a common stake in a measure that is under consideration, it may be very difficult for them to coordinate resources on
behalf of their position. The corporate form, by contrast, “provides a simple
way to channel rents to only those who have paid their dues, as it were. If you
do not own stock, you do not benefit from the larger dividends or appreciation
in the stock price caused by the passage of private interest legislation.” Corporations, that is, are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not
simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and organizational structure. Remove all restrictions on their electioneering, and the door
may be opened to a type of rent seeking that is “far more destructive” than
what noncorporations are capable of.324

Though Justice Stevens made his rent-seeking argument as part of a muddled defense of the antidistortion interest put forward in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce,325 Robert Sitkoff, cited by Justice Stevens, briefly advanced a more direct anti-rent-seeking rationale for corporate spending
limits. He focused on the deadweight loss of corporations fighting over government transfers, and corporations’ supposed comparative advantage in engaging in such rent-seeking activity.326
The idea that Congress should restore the corporate PAC requirement and
attempt to overturn Citizens United on anti-rent-seeking grounds has gained
currency. E.J. Dionne, echoing McChesney’s rent-extraction concerns, declared
that “[f]iscal conservatives should be as worried as anyone about corporations
using their newfound power to extract expensive benefits from the government.”327 Marvin Ammori, though phrasing his concern in terms of a “corruption economy,” argues that Citizens United “threatens the U.S. economy” because of corporate rent-seeking.328 Similarly, Samuel Issacharoff, writing in the
Supreme Court issue of the Harvard Law Review about Citizens United and al324. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 975 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Sitkoff, supra note 265, at 1113); see also id. at 977 (“A rule
that privileges the use of PACs thus does more than facilitate the political speech of likeminded shareholders; it also curbs the rent seeking behavior of executives and respects the
views of dissenters.”).
325. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
On Justice Stevens’ defense of Austin’s antidistortion interest, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 997-98
(2011).
326. Sitkoff, supra note 265, at 1112-13, 1124-25. Sitkoff did not discuss whether labor
unions and other organizations may have a similar advantage in organizing for such
activities.
327. E.J. Dionne Jr., The Price of Independence: Repairing Citizens United Becomes a
Test for Three GOP Senators, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2010, at A15.
328. Marvin Ammori, Corruption Economy, BOS. REV. (Sept. 9, 2010), http://
bostonreview.net/BR35.5/ammori.php.
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so using “corruption” terminology, suggests that a subset of corporations—
those with government contracts—could be barred from spending money on
election campaigns.329 He argues that doing so would “try to insulate politics
from the demands of those who would use public power for nonpublicregarding aims.”330
It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court, which decided Citizens United
heralding the value of unfettered speech and spending in elections, would be
willing to reconsider the matter under the anti-rent-seeking interest or the
broader concern about promoting national economic welfare. In Citizens United, the Court held that the anticorruption interest could not justify corporate
spending limits, because it held as a matter of fact that independent spending
cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.331
Perhaps the Justices would be more willing to entertain evidence that corporate spending limits would cause a decline in corporate rent-seeking. Even if
they did accept the promotion of national economic welfare as a compelling interest, however, it is not clear how the Court would balance this interest with
the First Amendment rights of corporations, particularly if it could be shown
that other entities, such as labor unions, also engage in rent-seeking activities
but would not be targeted by a new corporate (or government-contractor)
spending ban. In addition, very large corporations appear to be the ones engaging in the most rent-seeking activity, and so arguably only a law aimed at large
corporations would be properly tailored.332 The Court in Citizens United expressed concern that corporate spending limits could hurt small and nonprofit
corporations the most, because large corporations can lobby the government in
private and are more apt to get their way.333 Finally, the Court could decide
that the First Amendment costs of a corporate spending ban are so high that
even a compelling interest in curbing rent-seeking cannot justify an absolute
ban on spending from corporate treasury funds.334

329. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121-130,
139-42 (2010). Interestingly, Issacharoff never uses the “rent-seeking” terminology in making his argument, and focuses instead on concerns about “clientelism.” See id. at 127.
330. Id. at 140.
331. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010).
332. See id. at 907 (noting that many small corporations are affected by the statute,
which the Court said belied the government’s argument that the corporate ban was necessary
to deal with the “distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” (quoting Austin v.
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
333. Id.
334. The Citizens United majority implicitly rejected the argument that a PAC alternative for corporations adequately protected the corporations’ free speech rights. See id. at 930
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court majority “does
not even resolve the specific question whether Citizens United may be required to finance
some of its messages with the money in its PAC”). All of this, of course, depends upon the
composition of the Court at the time it would consider these issues. Citizens United was a 5-
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2. SEC pay-to-play rule for investment advisers
In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a rule335 to limit the campaign activities of investment advisers.336 Under the rule: (1) an investment adviser may not provide investment advisory services for compensation to a government entity within two years after making a contribution to an
official of the government entity it seeks to advise;337 (2) investment advisers
may not pay third parties, known as placement agents, to solicit government
entities for business on the adviser’s behalf unless the placement agent is also
subject to these restrictions;338 (3) investment advisers may not solicit or coordinate contributions to the government entity the adviser is seeking to provide
services to, or payments to political parties of the state or locality in which the
adviser seeks to or provides services;339 and (4) investment advisers may not
circumvent the rule by doing anything indirectly which, if done directly, would
result in a violation of the rule.340 Finally, probably in an effort to assuage First
Amendment concerns,341 the rule allows covered investment advisers to contribute up to $350 per election to officials for whom the adviser is entitled to vote,
or up to $150 to officials for whom the adviser is not entitled to vote.342

4 decision, and a change in personnel could lead the Supreme Court to accept the national
economic welfare interest (or some other interest) to justify corporate spending limits.
335. See Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-5 (2011). The rule is modeled on similar rules promulgated by the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD. R. G-37, G-38 (2011), available at msrb.org/rules-and-interpretations/msrb-rules.aspx.
336. The SEC proposed similar rules in 1999, but did not enact them. See Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1812, 70
SEC Docket 611 (Aug. 4, 1999).
337. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5(a)(1) (2011). A “contribution” includes a “gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made for: (i) The purpose of
influencing any election for Federal, State or local office; (ii) Payment of debt incurred in
connection with any such election; or (iii) Transition or inaugural expenses of the successful
candidate for State or local office.” Id. § 275.206(4)-5(f)(1).
338. Id. § 275.206(4)-5(a)(2)(i).
339. Id. § 275.206(4)-5(a)(2)(ii).
340. Id. § 275.206(4)-5(d). California recently adopted a similar rule. See Laura Mahoney, Schwarzenegger Signs Law to Make Placement Agents Register as Lobbyists, BNA
MONEY & POL. REP. (Oct. 6, 2010), http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display
.adp?fedfid=17877265&vname=mpebulallissues&fn=17877265&jd=a0c4j7f0r4&split=0.
341. The SEC paid close attention to the First Amendment concerns posed by contributions limits, and dedicated a section of its announcement to addressing these concerns. See
Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 3043, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,018, 41,023-24 (July 14, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
342. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5(b)(1) (2011).
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The impetus for the current rule appears to have been earlier “pay-to-play”
scandals.343 In 1999, Connecticut’s state treasurer pled guilty to racketeering
charges. He later admitted in court to collecting campaign contributions in exchange for “placing $500 million in state pension investments with certain equity funds.”344 In New York, a two-year investigation by Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo resulted in charges against former aides and fundraisers for
former State Controller Alan Hevesi.345
Though the SEC sought to justify its rules on anticorruption grounds, there
is also an efficiency rationale for the regulation. As the SEC release explained,
if elected officials allow political contributions to affect their management of
the funds, the retirees who rely on the funds can be harmed economically.346
The SEC regulations should pass constitutional muster if challenged, either on
anticorruption or national economic welfare grounds. As with the proposed
lobbyist antisolicitation rules, the SEC rules allow investment advisers to make
contributions, thereby allowing for the symbolic act of identifying with a candidate.347 But they seek to break the relationship of reciprocity which could
lead elected officials to make decisions that allow for rent-seeking as opposed
to representing the public interest.
CONCLUSION
Given the economic costs of the rent-seeking facilitated by lobbying activities, it is surprising that there has been so little focus on whether lobbying regulation might improve the U.S.’s financial situation. The post-Citizens United

343. The SEC referred to these and other scandals in its release announcing the new
rules. See Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, supra note 341, at
41,019-20.
344. Mike Allen, Ex-Treasurer in Connecticut Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1999, at B1.
345. Kenneth Lovett & Melissa Grace, Consultant Hank Morris, Hevesi Aide David
Loglisci Get Corruption Charges in $35M Pension Scheme, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 19,
2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/consultant-hank-morris-hevesi-aide-david-loglisci
-corruption-charges-35m-pension-scheme-article-1.363560.
346. According to the release:
The most qualified adviser may not be selected or retained, potentially leading to inferior
management or performance. The pension plan may pay higher fees because advisers must
recoup the contributions, or because contract negotiations may not occur on an arm’s-length
basis. The absence of arm’s-length negotiations may enable advisers to obtain greater ancillary benefits, such as “soft dollars,” from the advisory relationship, which might be used for
the benefit of the adviser, potentially at the expense of the pension plan, thereby using the
pension plan’s assets for the adviser’s own purposes.

Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, supra note 341, at 41,022.
347. The idea of allowing for a lower contribution limit makes sense (as opposed to an
outright ban), as it does in the lobbying context as well. Congress should consider lower individual and aggregate contribution limits for lobbyists and those who provide lobbyist support.
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jurisprudential world and the current financial crisis create an opportunity to
rethink our approach to federal lobbying regulation.
The existing framework of lobbying regulation, which severely restricts
lobbyist gifts and personal benefits conferred on legislators, should remain a
necessary component of federal lobbying regulation. Disclosure laws should
remain in place as well. These restrictions are amply justified on anticorruption
grounds. But further regulation, most notably antisolicitation rules, antibundling rules, and longer revolving-door prohibitions, may require new justifications after Citizens United. The national economic welfare rationale refocuses
our attention on the social inefficiencies of lobbyist-driven rent-seeking, and on
the connections of reciprocity between lobbyists and elected officials and staffers fueled by the use of money to forge and maintain relationships. In this story, lobbyists are no longer villains who routinely bribe elected officials to take
legislative actions against their better judgment. Instead, the social ill is a systemic one. It requires an answer that goes beyond platitudes about “undue influence” and recognizes that the future of our country’s national economic welfare could well depend upon meaningful political reform.
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